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PREFACE
Many countries have embarked on an energy transition 
that depends heavily on renewable energy sources. Some 
are also working to phase out nuclear energy. Others are 
shifting from coal and/or oil to natural gas, until such 
time as widespread reliance on renewables is seen as 
feasible and affordable. These transitions and policies 
for managing them are informed by a diverse set of 
scenarios, not all of which provide consistent outcomes 
and perspectives. In particular, there is no consensus 
as to whether the “extraordinary” curtailment in energy 
demand, as described by prospective and ambitious 
energy scenarios on energy efficiency, is attainable. 
At least for mature countries, these scenarios project 
economic growth without per capita increase in energy 
consumption. On the other hand, concerns about energy 
access and security, affordability and sustainability remain 
high on the agenda of both public and policy debates. 
Against this backdrop, IRGC began project work on 
“Energy Transitions: Demand Anticipation and 
Consumer Behaviour” in 2014. In line with IRGC’s 
focus on risk governance, it is motivated by the fact 
that large-scale energy transitions or transformations 
of energy systems that are to take place over the next 
few decades will redefine risks and opportunities within 
the energy and other sectors. Ability to anticipate such 
changes is crucial. But, while decision makers rightly 
use scenarios to inform their strategies and policies, 
many scenarios provide a false sense of confidence in 
projected or narrated evolutions of energy systems. 
The focus on demand anticipation and consumer 
behaviour is informed by the realisation that scenarios have 
traditionally focused on the supply side of energy systems 
while behaviour and end-use demands have received less 
attention. Also, failure to properly anticipate changes in the 
way energy will be consumed by different economic and 
social segments during and after the transitions constitute 
a major risk to private and public investors (including 
investment in the wrong technology) and policy makers 
(e.g. inability to maintain energy security).
In this context, IRGC and its partners, Helmholtz-Alliance 
Energy Trans and the Center for Climate and Energy 
Decision Making of Carnegie Mellon University, hosted 
on 9-10 October 2014, a workshop entitled “Demand 
Anticipation: Improving Methods to Assess Future 
Energy Demand.” The objective was to review different 
types of scenarios and modelling approaches to better 
anticipate the demand and to provide methodological 
guidance for developers and users of models and 
scenarios. The overarching goal is to help improve the 
governance of energy transitions. 
This Concept Note, originally prepared as a background 
paper to the workshop and subsequently updated, is 
written for an audience of energy modellers who develop 
models and scenarios, and decision-makers who 
commission or use them. It describes the mainstream 
energy scenarios and modelling approaches to illustrate 
the state of the art, and to stimulate thinking as to how 
these approaches can be used and improved for better 
assessment of energy demand.  
The Concept Note suggests that there is a need for 
more sophisticated energy demand models and/
or better scenarios, in particular using insights from 
Behavioural Sciences. IRGC also draws attention to 
the ways scenarios are being developed and used (and 
abused), and describes in broad brushstrokes different 
approaches for improving the usefulness of  models and 
scenarios, and for making robust decisions in face of 
deep uncertainties regarding scenarios and modeling 
outcomes. 
IRGC Concept Notes are publications that set the scene 
for a certain governance challenge, raise questions 
and prepare further work. They are primarily based on 
literature review and some discussion with experts, but 
they are not meant to provide policy recommendations.
2 ////
Abbreviations
ABM Agent-based modelling
DLR Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt 
EFOM Energy Flow Optimization Model
EIA U.S. Energy Information Administration
IAM Integrated Assessment Model
IEA International Energy Agency
IIASA International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
HERMES Harmonized Econometric Research for Modelling Economic Systems
MARKAL Market Allocation
MEDEE Modèle d’Evolution de la Demande d’Energie
NEMS National Energy Modeling System
PRIMES Price-Induced Market Equilibrium System
SAS Story-and-Simulation
SRES Special Report on Emissions Scenarios
TIMER Targets IMage Energy Regional
TIMES The Integrated MARKAL-EFOM System
VLEEM Very Long Term Energy Environment Model
WEC World Energy Council
3 ////
Preface 1
Executive Summary 5
1. Introduction 9
2. Is there a need for more sophisticated demand models / scenarios? 13
2.1 Energy demand projections often go widely astray 13
2.2 Risk associated with inadequate uncertainty analysis and communication 15
2.3 Options for improving energy demand scenarios 16
3. Broad scenario categories and development approaches 17
3.1 Broad scenario categories 18
3.2 How scenarios are developed 22
4. Modelling energy demand 23
4.1 Mainstream energy modelling approaches 24
4.2 Integrated assessment models 27
4.3 Improving the behavioral foundations of energy models 27
5. Different facets of demand-side uncertainty 31
5.1 Improving demand-side realism 31
5.2 Dealing with uncertainty: Some technical approaches 37
6. Usefulness and limitations of models and scenarios for energy planning 41
6.1 Diversity of scenarios and models 41
6.2 Importance of time horizons 42
6.3 Towards robust energy planning and strategies 42
6.4 Communicating scenario and modelling outcomes to policymakers 42
7. Conclusion and way forward 45
Bibliography and References 47
Acknowledgements 53 
About IRGC 54
CONTENTS
4 ////
Figures
Figure 1: Global primary energy consumption and transitions, 1800-2010 10
Figure 2: Total primary energy demand 2010-2035 10
Figure 3: Global energy-related CO2 emissions by scenario 10
Figure 4: Hybrid modelling of energy-environment policies: reconciling bottom-up and top-down 23
Figure 5: Adjustment lags in coal prices 36
Boxes
Box 1: Decoupling between energy consumption and economic growth 11
Box 2: Poor performance of past predictions of energy consumption in the US 14
Box 3: Systematic underestimation of final energy demand in Germany 14
Box 4: Consequence of using wrong forecasts 15
Box 5: Different types of scenarios 17
Box 6: Important considerations when using deterministic forecasts 18
Box 7: WEC-PSI Jazz and Symphony Scenarios 19
Box 8: Sociotechnical Scenarios 21
Box 9: Integration of backcasting and forecasting in IEA ETP Scenarios 21
Box 10: Economic theories 24
Box 11: Markal-Macro Model 26
Box 12: Overview of Integrated Assessment Models 27
Box 13: Overview of the BLUE, Res-IRF and CIMS models 28
Box 14: Myopic models for assessing the impact of short-term decisions 32
Box 15: Demand determination in TIMER model 33
Box 16: Sensitivity of final energy demand to discount rate 34
Box 17: Time-varying income and price elasticities of energy demand: the case of UK 1800-2000. 37
Box 18: Overview of PRIMES model 39
5 ////
Prior to choosing what direction to follow in making an 
energy transition, decision-makers look to scenario-
makers for advice on the economic and environmental 
consequences of alternative energy-transition pathways, 
energy-related policies, energy-mixes and any other 
intervention that might improve the transition process. 
One of the mainstays of current transitions, such as 
the German Energiewende, is the decoupling of energy 
consumption and economic growth by way of energy 
efficiency and, in some cases, energy sufficiency 
measures. These require both technological and 
behavioural changes. They underline how current energy 
transitions are not simply technological transitions but 
also socioeconomic transitions.
Many large-scale scenarios – at global level (e.g. IEA 450 
ppm Scenario 1, WWF World Scenario 2), regional level 
(e.g. EU 2020 Climate and Energy Package 3, EU 2030 
Framework for Climate and Energy Policies 4 and 2050 
Roadmap 5) and national level (e.g. Swiss Energy Strategy 
2050 6, UK Carbon Plan 7) – help frame visions on future 
energy systems. The majority of these scenarios focus 
on future energy mixes with a view to re-balancing 
the respective shares of energy sources, for example 
increasing the share of renewable energy and decreasing 
energy-related greenhouse gas emissions. 
However, few of these scenarios address novel drivers of 
energy consumption in a deliberate and comprehensive 
manner. Demand forecasts and projections have also 
often been criticised for being consistently inaccurate. 
Errors in forecasts tend to grow over time because of 
uncertainties associated with the impact of policy and 
unexpected changes in drivers such as the prices of 
energy. The Concept Note does not address these 
forecast errors but is instead informed by the specific need 
for many countries engaged in energy transitions to shift 
to low-energy consuming economies without sacrificing 
living standards. This requires profound behavioural and 
organisational change, encompassing technology shifts 
and implementation, which can be facilitated by lifestyle 
changes, including consumption behaviour (such as the 
use of energy-efficient devices), and the way consumers 
interact with energy providers. Scenarios and models 
need to account better for potential changes in future 
energy needs and energy services and the ability of 
policy to shape future demand. 
In this context, the Concept Note reviews the main types 
of energy scenarios and models currently used to anti- 
cipate energy demand and inform energy transitions. It 
highlights their limitations, in particular the uncertainties 
associated with assessing future demand, and underlines 
emerging trends that incorporate insight provided by be-
havioural economics. If the odds of achieving the goals 
of current energy transitions are to be improved, it will 
be crucial to improve energy scenarios and models. 
This paper firstly provides information for decision-
makers who commission and use scenarios as well 
as energy system modellers. It places the emphasis 
on energy demand anticipation. Secondly, it highlights 
important considerations for those developing and using 
energy scenarios for policy and strategic decision-
making. It suggests that scenario developers devote 
more attention to understanding and quantifying energy 
demands and their associated services and highlights 
relevant approaches. 
1 A scenario presented in the World Energy Outlook that sets out an energy pathway consistent with the goal of limiting the global 
increase in temperature to 2 °C by limiting concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere to around 450 parts per million of CO2.
2 A provocative scenario of the World Wildlife Fund that aims at a world that runs entirely on renewable energy by 2050.
3 A set of binding legislation, which aims to ensure the European Union meets its climate and energy targets for 2020.
4 An integrated policy framework for the period up to 2030 that ensures regulatory certainty for investors, and provides a coordinated 
approach for Member States.
5 A guide outlining plausible ways to achieve an 80% reduction target from a broad European perspective.
6 A strategy to restructure the Swiss energy system by 2050 excluding nuclear power generation.
7 UK government’s plans for achieving the reduction in emissions that it has committed to, including actions and milestones.
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Broad scenario categories and 
development approaches
The Concept Note provides an overview of three broad 
categories of scenarios: forecast, exploratory and nor-
mative. 
Forecast scenarios are typically quantitative scenarios 
based on historical trends. They incorporate the effect 
of current policy measures based on known causes and 
effect relationships between policy and impact. Forecast 
scenarios, such as those developed by the EIA 8 and the 
IEA World Energy Outlook 9, can offer reasonably good 
short-term predictions, but they become increasingly 
uncertain over time. 
Exploratory scenarios can be either qualitative or quan-
titative. They take into account expected policy measures, 
the effect of medium-term changes in current and new 
policy, as well as surprising events (wildcards). Examples 
include the World Energy Scenarios of the World Energy 
Council 10 and the Shell Energy scenarios. 
Normative scenarios are based on an anticipated vi-
sion of the future. They map out various designs of the 
vision, such as those of the IEA 450 ppm scenarios or 
the Greenpeace Energy Revolution scenarios 11, and use 
a “backcasting” approach in order to link short-term ac-
tions with long-term strategic objectives.  
In addition, there are various types of hybrid scenarios 
that combine normative and exploratory scenarios and 
qualitative and quantitative approaches. Sociotechnical 
scenarios constitute an emerging class of hybrid sce-
narios based on the premise that the embeddedness 
of energy technology in society can shape the future 
of our energy systems. Sociotechnical scenarios are 
quantitative scenarios modelled on the basis of qualita-
tive scenarios that provide narratives and storylines of 
plausible futures. Sociotechnical scenarios have been 
developed following the critique that energy models 
generally do not sufficiently reflect social and political 
developments. Taking these into account can help de-
velop more robust strategies and policies. In Germany, 
the Helmholtz Alliance Energy-Trans is involved actively 
in building such scenarios. 
In general, initial work for scenario development is based 
on literature review and expert elicitation. Many institutions 
are also turning to participatory exercises to elaborate 
energy scenarios. In the context of energy transitions and 
sustainable development, the ensuing participatory sce-
narios respond to the increasing need to involve relevant 
stakeholders at an early stage of decision-making. This 
approach provides a platform for different actors – from 
industry, government and the public – to better understand 
other actors’ perspectives, thus stimulating social learn-
ing and triggering systemic thinking. The French National 
Energy Debate illustrates the application of participatory 
scenarios through civil society engagement to inform the 
Energy Transition in France.  
Modelling energy demand
Energy models provide information that is often integrat-
ed in the process of developing qualitative scenarios, 
and also allows the generation of quantitative scenarios. 
Models are broadly classified as top-down (macroeco-
nomic), bottom-up (techno-economic / engineering), or 
hybrid (energy-economy). Different models have been 
developed for various uses and for specific contexts. 
In some of these models, energy demand is developed 
outside the energy models on the basis of major drivers 
such as income and population growth. In others, an 
endogenous approach is taken. The choice of model 
for specific end-uses is very important because energy 
transitions involve systemic effects at various levels. In-
accurate representation of energy demand in models can 
lead to poor policy analysis and prescriptions. 
Top-down models, due to their macroeconomic na-
ture, are particularly suitable for assessing the impact of 
energy-related policies on economic welfare. Demand 
is primarily driven by economic activity and popula-
tion growth, which assumes either market equilibrium 
or slow-adjustment to equilibrium. Because top-down 
models are often aggregated models of energy demand 
and supply, they are less suited to assessing demand for 
different energy carriers and services. Bottom-up models 
are more adapted to that end. 
Bottom-up models are techno-economic models that 
have extensive technological details by way of different 
8 Projections of the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s (EIA’s) Annual Energy Outlook 2014, on the factors that shape the U.S. 
energy system in the long term.
9 International Energy Agency’s (IEA) projections of energy trends through to 2040.
10 The report “Composing Energy Futures to 2050” assesses two contrasting policy scenarios.
11 Pathways for achieving climate goals through investment in renewable energy.
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levels of sectoral disaggregation (e.g. transportation, in-
dustry, residential and commercial) and further sub-sector 
disaggregation. For example, the IEA Energy Technology 
Perspectives (ETP) provide finer levels of sectoral analysis 
from which insights can be fed into the IEA World Energy 
Model – a bottom-up model – that is used for the IEA 
World Energy Outlook. The extent of sectoral disaggre-
gation needs to be aligned with the policy and strategic 
issues at hand. Policy relevance is also influenced by the 
spatial and temporal resolution of the models, including 
the extent and nature of market segmentation. Appropri-
ate spatiotemporal resolution is particularly important for 
capturing the dynamics of renewable resources.  
Most models used for informing energy transitions are 
of the hybrid-type, combining the macroeconomic view 
of top-down models with details of energy technologies 
in bottom-up models. Energy models are continuously 
being improved to address policy and strategy needs. 
One emerging trend is towards improving the microe-
conomic explicitness of models in light of behavioural 
economics. 
Behavioural models
In energy models, demand is often represented by means 
of conventional demand functions (e.g. GDP, growth and 
demography) and energy intensities (annual consumption 
per capita or per unit of GDP). Behavioural changes due to 
changes in social practices (e.g. driving behaviour) or struc-
tural changes (e.g. the rise of car-sharing) or technological 
changes (e.g. energy efficiency) are usually either grouped 
together or represented in conventional ways according to 
end-uses. When planning for transitions that span several 
decades, models can have serious limitations if they do not 
account for new behavioural patterns that unfold / emerge 
and have a significant impact on energy demand.
Attempts at improving the behavioural realism of models 
focus on representing different forms of behavioural fea-
tures through parameters and variables such as:  
• Discount rates. Time discounting and time prefer-
ence help assess temporal trade-offs between the 
short-term and the long-term, influencing investment 
decisions at various scales. The quality and reliability of 
energy demand assessment can possibly be improved 
through a more rigorous choice of discount rates.
• Market heterogeneity, to account for different prefer-
ences across consumers and businesses. Business 
behaviour, human behaviour and social preferences, 
encompassing institutional and jurisdictional frame-
works, supply-chain bottlenecks and social barriers 
can be important factors that influence the scope for 
converging to equilibrium points defined in models.
• Disutility costs, for example, range anxiety and charger 
stations availability for electric vehicles.
More theoretical and applied work is needed to ex-
pand on the major behavioural changes that drive 
new energy consumption patterns, and could possibly 
stimulate the transition from high-energy consuming 
to low-energy consuming economies, as well as the 
drivers of these behavioural changes (e.g. prices, tech-
nology, structural changes in society, policies, individual 
preferences, energy services). Options for improving 
the behavioural realism of models are being explored 
by various institutions, such as the EIA and IIASA. Prior 
efforts encompass work to include consequences of the 
rebound effect in energy efficiency.
Improving energy scenarios and models 
to account better for uncertainty
It is difficult to reduce many uncertainties in energy sys-
tems because some of the key parameters such as oil 
prices, technology competition, etc., although critical to 
energy models, are extremely difficult to predict. This 
uncertainty is often insufficiently recognized and com-
municated. There are however possibilities for energy 
scenario and model improvement, including:
• Better accounting for complexity or realism (e.g. 
adding more variables). 
• Understanding which model parameters can be modified 
to capture the critical uncertainties that affect demand. 
• Including knowledge about the evolution of energy-
related regulatory frameworks.
• Understanding which key parameters can truly be 
considered as independent and how these can evolve 
realistically. 
There are also modelling tools that can help deal with 
uncertainty (to the extent that it is reducible or relevant 
for decision-making purposes). Examples include:
• Cross-impact analysis, which provides a coherent and 
transparent approach to integrate interdisciplinary sourc-
es of knowledge analytically in scenario development. It 
allows a systematic study of combinations of input pa-
rameters, hence making the uncertainty and complexity 
of societal (and non-quantifiable) factors more explicit. 
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• Agent-based modelling, which helps address the un-
certainty and complexity that result from more realistic 
models of energy system transformations, e.g. by embed-
ding technological development within societal contexts.
• Stochastic simulation, which deals with uncertainty 
by testing different possible parameters within a pos-
sible range of values using Monte-Carlo simulation or 
similar approaches.
Usefulness and limitations of models 
and scenarios for energy planning 
The diversity of scenarios produced by different organisa-
tions reflects divergent views on determinants of energy 
futures such as economic growth, the role of business, 
the extent of social adaptation and the role of possible 
transition leaders. Recommendations from a workshop 
for scenario developers and modellers together with a 
review of relevant literature conclude that in view of the 
diversity of models, it is important to: 
1. Choose models that are fit for purpose. For 
instance:
• Macro models (based on econometric modelling 
or general equilibrium analysis) may be more 
appropriate for national level planning, while micro-
models are more suited for socioeconomic analysis. 
• Potentially, it is better to analyse factors that 
influence energy demand such as employment 
effects, rebound effects from energy efficiency 
policies and location of industries using top-down 
(macroeconomic) models rather than bottom-up 
(techno-economic) models.
• Use models that are appropriate for different time 
horizons. Some researchers have suggested that for 
short-term perspectives, top-down econometric-
based models may be more appropriate and 
make some predictions feasible. For medium-term 
outlooks (20-30 years) and policy assessment, top-
down models may be preferable. For longer-term 
planning (50 years) such as for current energy 
transitions, bottom-up models may be more 
suitable. When the system is likely to undergo 
intermittent technological and socioeconomic 
shifts, the emphasis should first be put on building 
qualitative and internally consistent pictures of 
plausible energy system development, then on 
quantification. 
2. Carefully match models with relevant scenarios 
and vice-versa. The risk in quantifying scenarios 
(narratives and storylines) with inappropriate models 
is that the analyses and recommendations generated 
are incongruous and raise controversy among both the 
community of researchers and the decision-makers.
3. Assess uncertainty and biases in energy scenarios 
and forecasts. Because they are likely to persist, it 
is critical to identify the multiple traits of uncertainty 
and biases as they are embedded in data, model and 
foresight exercises. The goal is to reduce uncertainty 
in critical parameters, which, in turn, increases 
reliability in energy modelling and ensures that vision 
is less open to criticism.
4. Communicate scenario and modelling outcomes 
adequately. Model-based scenarios can provide 
helpful and important decision support. To enhance 
the usefulness of their work, modellers should ensure 
that the underlying assumptions (such as the effect 
of induced technological change and heterogeneous 
behavioural responses to policy) and model 
uncertainties are well communicated so that they 
can be integrated in the decision-making process. 
Furthermore, communication on outcomes such as 
energy consumption levels, volumes of greenhouse 
gas emissions, and policy variables (e.g. tax rates) 
should be communicated in simple terms to policy-
makers and other stakeholders.
5. Engage multiple stakeholders in the development 
of scenarios, in particular for backcasting and 
sociotechnical scenarios, in order to steer upstream 
discussion of desired outcomes of transitions, 
opportunities and challenges, as well as steps to 
achieve the objective.
Conclusion
When planning energy transitions it is paramount to de-
termine the evolution of energy demand. This requires a 
multidisciplinary approach to understand the many drivers 
of transition that result in a low-energy-consuming econ-
omy. It is also important to integrate broader regional and 
international contexts in national plans for energy transi-
tions. Such an inclusive approach poses challenges to both 
scenario developers and modellers because of a number of 
crosscutting issues that are often hard to quantify because 
there is no historical precedence. There is a growing interest 
for research in this field, which decision makers are invited 
and encouraged to follow so that decisions in relation to 
energy transitions can be improved.
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1.
INTRODUCTION
In their task of drawing up a strategy for a transition to 
more secure, equitable and sustainable energy systems 
(WEC, 2008), decision-makers are faced with much un-
certainty as to the future evolution of energy demand 
and supply. They therefore turn to scenarios. The Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defines 
scenarios as “a coherent, internally consistent and plau-
sible description of a possible future state of the world”. 
A scenario is not so much a forecast as an “alternative 
image of how the future can unfold.” Energy scenarios 
aim at providing a comprehensive view of the impact of 
different developmental trends on the likely evolution 
of the energy system and potential outcome of energy 
systems’ variables and performance indicators. Differ-
ent scenarios – and models underlying these scenarios 
– provide a range of scientific evidence, which are not 
intended as predictions or policy recommendations but 
rather to inform decision-making.  
Contemporary energy scenarios are driven by a combina-
tion of macroeconomic trends, the current understanding 
of policies and rates of technological change, and climate 
change considerations. Certain factors are often ignored 
or underestimated in energy scenarios. These include: 
(i) the influence of socioeconomic, cultural and demo-
graphic structures on the energy market and the adoption 
of new technology; (ii) the pervasiveness of legacy and 
maladapted infrastructure, and (iii) low-predictability, 
high-consequence events (or shocks) such as the discov-
ery or exploitation of new energy sources 12 (Stout, 1998). 
It is necessary to acknowledge that some uncertainty will 
always remain to avoid foolhardy mistakes when using 
scenarios in planning for and governing energy transitions. 
Generally, existing models that inform energy scenarios, 
or which are used to quantify scenarios, are typically 
better at characterizing the supply side of energy systems 
than that of demand. As a result, mainstream scenarios 
tend to underestimate the influence of social trends and 
behaviour on energy use. There is, in effect, increasing 
recognition that the demand side is not sufficiently taken 
into consideration, in particular concerning “technolo-
gy adoption, the complexity of choice-making, and the 
human-dimensions of energy use and environmental 
change” (Sovacool, 2014). This too is true in respect 
of more general behavioural perspectives that relate to 
the behaviour of policy-makers, consumers and utilities. 
Extrapolating from the observation that, in the past, en-
ergy models have adapted to external circumstances 
and needs (see below), research can help develop new 
insights, informed by behavioural economics, to address 
the aforementioned shortcomings in current scenarios 
and models. Some organisations such as the EIA and 
IIASA are already working in that direction.  
Figure 1 shows the rising trend in global energy consump-
tion and major transitions between 1800 and 2010. The 
transition to coal from biomass is by far the longest tran-
12 For instance, the large-scale development of unconventional gas and oil was unforeseen and therefore not factored into 
scenarios one or two decades ago.
Figure 1: Global primary energy consumption  
and transitions, 1800-2010.  
Source: Fouquet (2009) in Fouquet and Pearson (2012)
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Figure 2: Total primary energy demand 2010-2035. 
Source: Adapted from IEA-WEO (2012)
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sufficiency. At the same time, climate change remains 
high on the agenda (see Figure 3). Figure 3 shows the 
global energy-related carbon-dioxide (CO2) emissions for 
four different scenarios for OECD and non-OECD coun-
tries. The red line shows CO2 projections under current 
policies; the blue line indicates corresponding predictions 
for expected policies not yet in place. The Efficient World 
Scenario’s predictions (dashed line) reflect the results of 
adopting current and proven technologies to improve 
energy efficiency. The 450 Scenario are projections (green 
line) associated with the normative vision of an upper limit 
of 450 parts per million (ppm) of CO2 in the atmosphere.
13 Note that the IEA was established in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis. 
14 Relative decoupling means that energy consumption may increase but at a slower rate than economic growth. Absolute decoupling 
is achieved when energy use declines over time while the economy grows. 
Box 1: Decoupling between energy consumption and economic growth
Source: Raworth (2012) Source: BP (2014)
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sition, also marked by the Industrial Revolution and the 
beginning of a new era of prosperity and growth in energy 
consumption. The second transition is that of coal to oil. 
The first energy scenarios were developed in the 1950s, 
i.e. during an era of modernization, and energy models 
were embedded in the physical reality of energy sys-
tems. The techno-economic models of the 1970s were 
based on macroeconomic premises and the prevailing 
neo-classical economic paradigm, and were developed 
in response to the oil crisis 13, which also prompted a 
‘transition’ to natural gas. Shell scenarios, beginning in 
1965, constituted a marked departure from the premise 
of historical knowledge and extrapolated trends to more 
descriptive scenarios based on disciplined imaginations 
or visions of the future, respectively exploratory and nor-
mative scenarios.
Figure 2 shows projected global primary energy demand 
up to 2035 following two different scenarios, both of which 
indicate a break from the unprecedented increase in de-
mand over the past 50 years. The green line shows the 
ambitious objective of curtailing energy demand to halve 
energy demand growth by 2035. This may constitute one 
of the major challenges of current energy transitions, 
since reduced growth in energy consumption should not 
have to be at the expense of economic growth or to the 
detriment of the environment. Economic growth that is 
accompanied by a reduction in energy demand is only 
feasible if energy demand is decoupled 14 from economic 
growth through energy efficiency (see Box 1) and energy 
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Figure 3: Global energy-related CO2 emissions by scenario. 
Source: Adapted from IEA-WEO (2012). 
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As a result, the large-scale energy transitions or trans-
formations of energy systems over the next few decades 
will lead to substantially redefined risks and opportunities 
within the energy sector. Planners will need to develop 
new assumptions concerning drivers of change and how 
demand is likely to evolve. Existing and mainstream ap-
proaches to assessing future energy demand – i.e. those 
based on income, energy prices, population growth and 
demography – may well be inadequate. 
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2.
IS THERE A NEED FOR  
MORE SOPHISTICATED DEMAND 
MODELS / SCENARIOS?
The unprecedented nature of current energy transitions makes managing present transitions on historical 
knowledge and historical dependencies in energy models impossible. There is a perceived need for more 
behavioural or microeconomic realism in energy demand models and scenarios, which lies in the differences 
between past and present (and prospective transitions). In particular: 
• Anticipated transitions, at least in Europe, entail limiting highly polluting energy sources (some of 
which were instrumental in past transitions and may remain a linchpin in current transitions as in the 
case of German Energiewende); introducing thrifty energy consumption measures, while conserving 
consumer sovereignty and sustainable lifestyles. By contrast, past transitions were driven by fossil 
(polluting) energy sources and were accompanied by increases in energy consumption, in turn 
fuelled by economic growth and economic prosperity.
• The progressive liberalization of retail energy markets also implies growing consumer options and 
modified energy market dynamics that are not captured in more general aggregate demand models. 
• Demand-side developments such as demand adaptation, co-generation and storage for own 
consumption, whether at plant or household level, are likely to be energy-game changers for realistic 
rates of technological progress.
To understand the impact of these developments, the question is, on one hand, whether forecast / projection 
models should be more sophisticated and, on the other, whether energy models and scenarios where the 
epistemological basis follows techno-rationalistic and economically motivated paradigms need also to include 
ecological – and, when not the case, to what extent – and behavioural dimensions of energy systems. In this 
respect, attempts at determining the likely evolution of energy demand have often failed.
2.1 Energy demand projections 
often go widely astray
Prior research has shown that energy-forecasting sce-
narios have often seriously misjudged energy demand 
(Morgan and Keith, 2008). The leftmost plot in Box 2 
shows the summary of forecasts of primary energy con-
sumption in the US for the year 2000 compiled by Smil 
(2003) as a function of the date on which they were made. 
The rightmost plot compares the forecasts of primary en-
ergy consumption in the US in three scenarios developed 
by the Ford Foundation Energy Project as well as other 
studies, compiled by Greenberger (1983), reported in the 
diagramme. Except for Ford Foundation’s Zero Energy 
Growth Scenario, all scenarios projected much higher 
energy consumption. Although it displays the smallest 
prediction error, the Zero Energy Growth Scenario may 
not have captured the actual driver(s) of the low-energy 
consumption path. Besides, the results of these energy 
scenarios should not be interpreted as forecasts. 
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Box 2: Poor performance of past predictions of energy consumption in the US
Box 3: Systematic underestimation of final energy demand in Germany
Source: Smil (2003)
Source: DLR Analysis (personal communication)
Greenberger (1983), adapted from Morgan and Keith (2008)
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In contrast to the previous US example, since 2002, most 
energy scenarios for Germany (as listed in the plot in Box 
3), have systematically underestimated energy demand. 
The black line starting in 2000 corresponds to actual 
energy demand in Germany until 2013 (in petajoules (PJ)). 
The other lines correspond to model-based projections 
commissioned by the German government to inform the 
2010 energy reform plans as well as some earlier pro-
jections. The varying rates of decline across scenarios 
are possibly due to different assumptions or the different 
models used to generate these figures. (Including the 
drivers of the differences is beyond the scope of this 
Concept Note.) However, what is of particular concern is 
that such an underestimation of demand, unless demand 
is curbed in the near future, may undermine any chances 
of the German Energiewende succeeding as described 
in the next section.  
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Box 4: Consequence of using wrong forecasts
Source: EOP (2014)
2.2 Risk associated  
with inadequate uncertainty 
analysis and communication
Many scenarios and models do not emphasize uncer-
tainty sufficiently. As mentioned earlier, Morgan and 
Keith (op. cit.) advocate using probabilistic estimates as 
opposed to point estimates. They also argue that while 
scenarios can be helpful, they can often be misleading 
since compelling storylines and narratives can make 
decision-makers more susceptible to availability bias. 
Often scenario developers and modellers are aware of 
the uncertainty, but fail to communicate it adequately to 
users who rely on the scenarios. This can result in poor 
decisions and even policy failures, where the expected 
outcome of policy measures is not reached. The risk of 
policy failure can be exacerbated by systemic negative 
externalities (see Box 4).
Long-term forecasts are often incorrect due to unex-
pected events or, for instance, when uncertainties are 
underestimated. Erroneous forecasts can stem from (i) 
variations in relative fuel prices, (ii) changing policies 
and regulations, (iii) faster or slower technological pro-
gress and technological breakthrough, and (iv) changing 
demand patterns and levels. One example of the latter 
concerns the change in driving habits (Dutzik and Baxan-
dall, 2013) and policy-induced vehicle fuel-efficiency 
gains that led to forecasts of motor gasoline consump-
tion in the U.S. going astray (see figure below.). But does 
it matter?
Erroneous forecasts can have real policy consequences, which may backfire. For instance, the 2007 US Renewable Fuel 
Standard (RFS), mandating higher biofuel production, was based on forecasts of continuous growth in the use of gasoline. 
It led to a rapid expansion of the production of corn ethanol in the U.S. But, gasoline use stagnated, adversely affecting 
not only the refineries concerned but also other biofuels markets, where growth was desirable, but stalled due to the initial 
spike in ethanol (Schnepf and Yacobucci, 2013). Such negative cross-market externalities are often hard to predict.
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Systematically underestimating actual energy demand as 
reflected in the energy scenarios for Germany (Box 3) also 
leads to policy risks and the chance that energy systems 
will not perform as expected. For instance, projections 
that show a decline in energy demand can result in an 
underestimation of the effort required on the supply-side. 
Switching to renewable sources and reducing demand 
by means of greater efficiency is one of the fundamentals 
of the German Energiewende since the resulting energy 
efficiency contributes to a reduction in CO2 emissions ce-
teris paribus (i.e. everything else remaining unchanged). 
Projections of a continuous decline in demand reduce the 
incentive to increase investment in renewables, especially 
when this is costly. The currently observed gap between 
actual and projected energy demand is indicative of po-
tential shortcomings in the demand scenarios, which, 
if translated into policy optimism, could undermine the 
Energiewende efforts.
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2.3 Options for improving energy 
demand scenarios
From a modelling and scenario-making perspective, 
there are several possibilities for improving anticipation 
of energy demand. The way forward will depend largely 
on the policy or strategic questions.  
2.3.1 
New representations of energy demand: 
useful energy and embodied energy
In 2007, the IEA (2007) explored the possibility of mod-
elling energy end-use or energy services and deriving 
energy demands for different energy efficiency scenarios. 
Ayres and Voudouris (2014) show that this approach, 
in allowing economic development to be linked to the 
evolution of useful energy rather than energy demand, 
is more suitable for decisions such as assessing tech-
nological pathways.  
In the same manner, Pourouchottamin et al. (2013) ex-
plore the concept of embodied energy – all energy that 
is used either directly or indirectly for supplying goods 
or services – to provide new representations of energy 
consumption. The authors contend that embodied energy 
has the advantage of highlighting the energy content of 
societal consumption as well as the social dimension of 
energy transition. 
2.3.2 
Behaviourally realistic energy 
demand models
Improving the behavioural realism of energy end-use 
models can be achieved in at least two ways. A first 
approach involves adding behavioural drivers such as 
disutility costs, social and environmental preferences 
to existing models, or even making some parameters 
endogenous. This approach can play a significant role 
in increasing the complexity of existing models or even 
require a wholesale replacement of models. A second 
approach is to identify model parameters, some of which 
may be inherently uncertain, where quantification may be 
improved based on understanding of human behaviour 
as informed by behavioural economics, e.g. different 
discount rates for different households, which vary 
according to factors such as lifestyle and savings be-
haviour. By altering existing model parameters, greater 
demand segmentation can also substantially increase 
the complexity of models.
Further theoretical 15 and applied work – along the lines 
of those being pursued by IIASA 16 and the EIA (2014) – is 
needed to clarify the major behavioural changes behind 
new energy consumption patterns. These might possibly 
stimulate the transition from a high-energy consuming 
economy to a low one. It is therefore important to also 
understand the drivers of these behavioural changes (e.g. 
prices, technology, structural changes in society, policies, 
individual preferences, energy services) (see Section 4.3). 
It is important to assess the impact, e.g. in terms of pol-
icy relevance, of modifying demand models, whether 
by adding variables or by altering parameters. Given 
the potential increase in complexity, the question is 
therefore how and to what extent the behavioural real-
ism of models needs improving. Increasing complexity 
should be favoured if adding complexity enables more 
accurate results to be produced in terms of projections. 
Furthermore, modellers should be expected to be able to 
communicate complexity to the relevant stakeholders in 
an appropriate manner (see Section 6.4.). Simple models 
may be more appropriate for specific end-uses and are 
usually preferred when the goal is not to predict the fu-
ture, but to comprehend the consequences of changes 
in policies. They provide a better understanding of the 
various effects, policy measures, for example, not only 
for policy makers but also for the modellers themselves. 
The gains from complexity, whether by making some 
parameters endogenous, adding new variables or by 
using more disaggregated demand models, need to be 
assessed carefully and trade-offs between complexity 
and impact balanced. To inform work in this area, the 
next two sections provide a review of different scenario 
types and the relevant energy models.
15 See for instance Wilson and Dowlatabadi (2007) and Politt and Shaorshadze (2013).
16 See Wilson, Pettifor and McCollum (2014).
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3.
BROAD SCENARIO CATEGORIES 
AND DEVELOPMENT 
APPROACHES
Scenarios are often categorised as qualitative versus quantitative, or exploratory versus normative. Qualitative 
scenarios describe plausible long-term futures and are based on the observations of multiple stakeholders. They 
are presented in the form of narratives or storylines, which need to be subjected to quantitative analysis to verify 
consistency. Following Börjeson et al. (2006) and Vergragt and Quist (2011), this section first describes three 
categories of scenarios, namely (i) forecast-based 17, (ii) exploratory and (iii) normative scenarios as they are used 
in the context of energy systems. Many of these scenarios are developed as either qualitative or quantitative 
scenarios or as hybrid scenarios, in which case attempts are made at bridging different scenarios. 
These three types of scenarios form the fundamental basis for future studies, classified as likely futures in fore-
casting, possible futures in exploratory scenarios or normative / desirable futures in backcasting scenarios, (see 
Box 5). Both exploratory and backcasting scenarios were developed in the 1970s as alternatives to forecasting. 
As described in the following subsections, these scenarios are not used in the same manner by all institutions – a 
demonstration of distinct knowledge bases, organisational resources and analytical rigor. Section 3.1 is followed 
by a brief description of the base on which the scenarios are developed, focusing on a participatory approach.
Box 5: Different types of scenarios
Source: WEC (2013) Source: www.naturalstep.org
Energy
consumption
Historical Present
Policy-A
Trend extrapolation
Policy-B
Future
a. Forecast-based scenarios b. Exploratory scenarios c. Backcasting scenarios
17 Börjeson et al. (2006) use the term “predictive scenarios” to include forecasting and what-if scenarios, while Vergragt and Quist 
(2011) distinguish between trend-extrapolating scenarios and classify forecasts under exploratory scenarios. Herein, forecasts are 
used as data-driven projections, encompassing both trend-extrapolations and what-if predictions.
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3.1 Broad scenario categories
3.1.1 
Forecast-based scenarios
Forecast-based scenarios are usually quantitative, em-
pirical scenarios 18. Different forecasting traditions either 
from a deterministic perspective or taking a positivistic 
(presupposition) stance – as in what-if scenarios – will 
project distinctive future paths. These are noticeable from 
the underlying assumptions of what is to happen. Deter-
ministic forecasts are, by definition, point estimates. The 
simplest forecasts are based on simple trend-extrapo-
lation as used for business-as-usual (BAU) scenarios 
or reference scenarios; they constitute a sub-class of 
forecast scenarios and only consider policies already 
in place (i.e. current policies), typically assuming linear 
effects over the forecast horizons. They indicate what is 
likely to happen if no further actions are taken, or if new 
policies fail. They are based on known data, i.e. historical 
knowledge obtained from the past. Box 6 summarises 
some of the major considerations when using determin-
istic forecasts.
Many forecasts also include new policies, whether al-
ready in place, or expected with a reasonable degree 
of certainty to be so, and are adjusted according to the 
expected impact of these policy interventions. However, 
the complexity of energy systems – in view of inter-market 
coupling – also makes it hard to predict policy impacts. 
What-if forecasts are based on different what-if scenarios 
of possible policy impacts, including potential breaks in 
trends and are often referred to as projections. 
Organisations using forecast-based scenarios include the 
International Energy Association (IEA), the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration (EIA), BP and Statoil, but they 
differ in their forecasting approach. In particular, we can 
distinguish between aggregated forecasting approaches 
and bottom-up demand forecasting approaches. EIA’s 
National Energy Modelling System (NEMS) is one such 
bottom-up forecasting and analytical tool that uses a 
four-fold segmentation (residential, transportation, in-
dustrial and commercial sectors 19) of energy demand for 
each of the nine US census regions; demand is deter-
mined by market-clearing prices (prices at which demand 
and supply are balanced) in end-use demand regions. As 
discussed in Section 4, many scenarios are also based 
18 There is common confusion that demand forecasts are necessarily quantitative construct. However, some decision-makers may 
use qualitative demandw forecasts that are based on the intuition and judgment of experts, especially when trends are uncertain 
and data for quantitative analysis is inadequate or not available.
19 www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/nems/documentation/integrating/pdf/m057%282013%29.pdf
Box 6: Major considerations for using deterministic forecasts
Deterministic forecasts are based on a number of building blocks, namely (i) discernible and quantifiable past trends; (ii) 
steady and persistent societal structure and social behaviour; and (iii) the assumption that underlying data is neutral and 
reproducible. These assumptions are necessarily violated in any system undergoing transition. To be useful, deterministic 
forecasts have to be reproducible and open to easy and objective validation, i.e. unencumbered by the subjective criteria or 
mental image of experts in model assessment. Robinson (1982) gives some examples of selection / perception bias including 
instances where lack of knowledge of new behaviours can lead forecasts astray.
Although well-specified econometric models can have reasonable short-term predictive power, by definition, long-term 
forecasts are highly uncertain. BAU forecasts, for instance, often overshoot; decisions based on excessive forecasts can 
have real (often negative) consequences. High demand growth projections may be used to justify investment in the con-
struction of large energy plants, which leads to wasteful over-capacity that, in turn, may encourage over-consumption. It 
highlights the self-fulfilling potential of high predictions and potential technological lock-in considering the long lifetime of 
energy infrastructures. 
Another problem with forecasts is that deterministic forecasts – in the form of point-estimates or those based on the “most 
likely” criterion – are the most commonly reported. The risk is that point-estimates provide a false-sense of confidence to 
decision-makers. Probabilistic forecasting (Morgan and Keith, 2008) and stochastic scenario analysis (Kann and Weyant, 
2000; see also Section 5.2.2) are therefore recommended. 
The usefulness of deterministic forecasts lies not in predicting the long to very long term, but in its ability to help verify the 
internal consistency of diverse projections of energy futures, especially those forecasts determined by complex and fre-
quently, complex black-box models.
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20 Wildcards refer to sudden or unique incidents that can constitute turning points in the evolution of a certain trend or systems; their 
anticipation depends on the foresight capabilities of the scenario builders. 
Box 7: WEC-PSI Jazz and Symphony Scenarios
Jazz Symphony
Overview
World where there is a consumer focus on achieving energy 
access, affordability, and quality of supply with the use of 
best available energy sources.
World where there is a voter consensus on driving en-
vironmental sustainability and energy security through 
corresponding practices and policies.
Many players are multi-national companies, banks, venture 
capitalists, and price-conscious consumers.
Main players are governments, public sector and private 
companies, NGOs, and environmentally minded voters.
Technologies are chosen in competitive markets Governments pick technology winners
Energy sources compete on the basis of price and avail-
ability
Selected energy sources are subsidized and incentivised 
by governments
Renewable and low-carbon energy grows in line with mar-
ket selection
Certain types of renewable and low-carbon energy are 
actively promoted by governments.
In the absence of international agreed commitments, car-
bon market grows more slowly from the bottom up based 
on regional, national and local initiatives.
Carbon market is top-down based on an international 
agreement, with commitments and allocations.
Consumer acceptance
High public acceptance of energy infrastructure projects 
consistent with access to cheap and affordable energy 
sources
Tension between voter consensus on driving environmental 
sustainability through government decisions and individuals 
and NGO opposition to new developments, leading to fewer 
project developments and less infrastructure reinforcement.
Consumer behaviour and lifestyle
Higher energy consumption irrespective of energy-efficiency 
savings; higher energy prices motivate more investments 
in efficient equipment, insulation and appliances (i.e. such 
investments are justified by efficiency gains and economics).
High impact from energy efficiency and saving programmes. 
Global demand for energy is lower because of lower growth 
and changes in lifestyle (i.e. heightened environmental con-
sciousness), in part triggered by government incentives.
on hybrid models that take into account both bottom-up 
and top-down modelling approaches. Statoil Energy 
Scenarios include what-if forecast scenarios, based on 
expert judgment of changes in trends, the precise timing 
of which is inevitably uncertain.
3.1.2 
Exploratory scenarios
Exploratory or explorative scenarios look at alternative 
futures of the energy system and its subsystems, based 
on an understanding of the present and expectation as 
to what could happen should an event come about or 
a trend grow. Exploratory scenarios are IF-THEN sce-
narios and are often informed by wildcard 20 analysis. 
Organisations using exploratory scenarios typically focus 
on extreme scenarios that demonstrate polarities. This 
implicitly recognizes that the future is unforeseeable. In 
addition, extreme scenarios are not intended to be per-
ceived as good or bad, but as plausible depending on 
the drivers of the underlying scenarios (see Box 7 for an 
illustration). 
Organisations using explorative scenarios include Shell 
(2008, 2013), the World Energy Council (2013) and Exx-
onMobil (2013), all focusing on extreme scenarios or 
maximally contrasting scenarios, driven by opposing 
assumptions of the scenario drivers. For example, in the 
WEC-PSI Jazz Scenario, technologies are chosen by the 
market, while in the Symphony Scenario, it is govern-
ments that select the technology.
Source: Adapted from WEC-PSI (2013)
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3.1.3 
Normative scenarios 
Normative scenarios are based on visioning, often com-
bined with backcasting 21. In backcasting, the first step 
is to set the desirable end-state most often through a 
multi-stakeholder process that defines a desirable energy 
future – because of this visioning process backcasting 
scenarios are considered to be normative. Then, on the 
basis of the desirable future and assessment of trajec-
tories or pathways that could have been taken given the 
current state, possible paths or roadmaps 22 to bridge 
the gap between the current state and envisioned end-
state are developed. Normative scenarios can thus be 
seen as potentially more ambitious. Importantly, energy 
backcasting is closely policy-oriented and is particular-
ly appropriate for the optimization of energy demand 
(Karjalainen et al., 2014). It is noteworthy that since its 
development in the 1970s, backcasting has, to a signif-
icant extent, evolved into a participatory exercise (see 
Section 3.2).
Organisations using backcasting philosophy include the 
IEA (450 ppm scenario), ENERDATA (Very Long Term 
Energy Environment Modelling, VLEEM 23). The IEA World 
Energy Outlook 450 ppm scenario, for example, fixes the 
emissions target at 450 ppm and assesses the demand 
level and energy mix that would help achieve this target. 
3.1.4 
Hybrid scenarios 
Many scenarios are either qualitative or quantitative in 
nature. In addition, except for backcasting scenarios, the 
end-points of the energy systems determined by other 
types of scenarios are uncertain. Because of this, and 
more generally, there are conceivable merits to integrating 
different types of scenarios.   
Firstly, the combination of forecast-based and explorato-
ry scenarios is necessary because while energy forecasts 
are subject to uncertainty, exploratory scenarios investi-
gate the uncertainty and together they reveal important 
issues. They are particularly pertinent for short-term 
decision-making in view of the long-term objectives 
(O’Mahony, 2014; O’Mahony, Zhou and Sweeny, 2013). 
Secondly, because exploratory scenarios are by and large 
qualitative scenarios that are often presented in the form 
of storyline scenarios, they have to be analysed with 
quantitative energy system modelling (i.e. it is important 
to quantify qualitative scenarios) so as to understand 
systemic effects. This is especially the case when these 
exploratory scenarios concern highly uncertain and com-
plex sociotechnical contexts. Examples include the Story 
and Simulation (SAS) approach (Alcamo, 2001, 2008) 
used, for instance, in the IPCC Special Report on Emis-
sions Scenarios (SRES) 24, and McDowall (2014) as well 
as sociotechnical scenarios (see Box 8).
Thirdly, the combination of backcasting and exploratory 
(and/or forecast-based) scenarios can be adopted as a 
means to develop robust strategies and policies (see, 
for example, van Vliet and Kok, 2013), where backcasts 
are positive performance metrics, such as sustainability 
elements, that are introduced as constraints in otherwise 
undesirable futures (such as excessive carbon emis-
sions). The long horizon of energy backcasting has to 
be balanced with the short-term approach of forecasting 
used to inform policy (see Box 9 for a description of the 
IEA’s integration of backcasting and forecasting).
21 As used in this document “backcasting” refers to choosing some desired future end-state and then asking what has to happen 
to result in that end-state. The term backcasting has a second meaning in which an existing model is initialized at some time in 
the past and then run forward to see how its outputs compare with what has actually happened. This approach is widely used in 
natural science, but unfortunately is rarely used in energy modelling.
22 The WBSCD (2010) backcasts from a vision of a sustainable world and suggests nine pathways to the desired end-state.
23 www.vleem.org/PDF/final-report.pdf
24 See www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg2/en/ch2s2-4-5.html  
and www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg2/en/ch2s2-4-6.html
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25 europa.eu/legislation_summaries/energy/european_energy_policy/l27079_en.htm
26 See www.energy-trans.de/english
Box 8: Sociotechnical Scenarios
Box 9: Integration of Backcasting and Forecasting in IEA ETP Scenarios
Sociotechnical scenarios (STScs) are hybrid scenarios that combine normative and exploratory scenarios, and are informed 
by the critique that energy models (described below) poorly reflect social and political developments (Weimer-Jehle, Prehofer 
and Vögele, 2013). Revealingly, Nielsen and Karlsson (2007: 314) argue that “Energy scenario studies tend to leave out im-
portant descriptions of the total system they are part of (economic, social and infrastructural structures in society) leading 
to conclusions detached from the political context in which they act.”
Accordingly, STScs include strong societal and behavioural change to assist policy makers in designing strategies that take 
into account the long-term and socio-technical nature of transitions (Hofman et al., 2004). The predominant premise of ST-
Scs is that system-wide innovation, involving changes in technologies, user practices, legislation, infrastructure, networks 
and institutions, results in much greater improvement than partial system redesign and system optimization (in decreasing 
order). For large-scale transitions involving technological change, STScs provide a viable alternative to the oft-used techno-
logical forecasting methods (typically based on technological substitutions) that are of limited value because they pay little 
or no attention to the interaction between technology and society. STScs have been informed by several lines of research 
on co-evolving sociotechnical system (e.g. Geels, 2002), techno-institutional complex (Unruh, 2000) and the perspective 
that technological systems are “both socially constructed and society shaping” (Hughes, 1987). The integration of actor and 
technology networks thus follows from the observation that economic agents have the ability to influence system outcomes 
through deliberate choices but that their influence is diminished by interactions with other actors (actor networks) and technol-
ogies (technology networks, Hughes and Strachan, 2010). The integration is based on co-evolution and feedback processes.
 
The main advantage of sociotechnical scenarios is that they are normatively guided explorations of the future. As such, they 
retain plausibility and improve policy relevance through attention to real-world constraints faced by actors and their agency 
as well as through feedback modelling. Actors in these scenarios can be divided into two categories, namely current and 
new. Current actor behaviour can be modelled on existing evidence, whether from historical analysis, interviews or expert 
surveys, while the behaviour of new actors needs to be hypothesized or inferred from role plays or new models. These sce-
narios also allow for changes in current actors’ motivations, distinguishing between intrinsic and extrinsic drivers, and the 
consequent changes in technical system dynamics (Hughes, Strachan and Gross, 2013).
In Europe, sociotechnical scenarios are used increasingly to inform the transition of energy systems, whether driven by na-
tional or regional policies such as the European Union’s Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET-Plan 25), and as reflected in 
the work of Ornetzeder, Rohracher and Wächter (2012), Foxon et al. (2009) and Helmholtz-Alliance Energy-Trans 26.
Energy Technology Perspectives 2014 (ETP 2014) applies a combination of backcasting and forecasting over three scenarios 
from now until 2050.
Advantage of this approach: Backcasting lays out plausible pathways to a desired end-state. It makes it easier to identify 
milestones that need to be reached, or trends that need to change rapidly, for the end-goal to be achieved. In this case, the 
advantage of forecasting, where the end state is a result of the analysis, is that it takes better into account the short-term 
constraints. By combining differing modelling approaches that reflect the realities of the given sectors, together with extensive 
expert consultation, ETP obtains robust results and in-depth insights.
Weaknesses of the approach: The analysis and modelling aim to identify the most economical way for society to reach the 
desired outcome, but for a variety of reasons the scenario results do not necessarily reflect the least-cost ideal. Many subtleties 
cannot be captured in a cost optimisation framework: political preferences, feasible ramp-up rates, capital constraints and 
public acceptance. For the end-use sectors (buildings, transport and industry), doing a pure least-cost analysis is difficult 
and not always suitable. Long-term projections inevitably contain significant uncertainties, and many of the assumptions 
underlying the analysis are likely to prove to be inaccurate.
Source: Adapted from www.iea.org/etp/etpmodel
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3.2 How scenarios are developed
Scenarios can be developed in many contrasting ways. 
They can be based on expert opinions as in the case of 
Shell scenarios, they can be elaborated through mul-
tistakeholder participatory approaches or they can be 
more desktop research-oriented, based on literature 
reviews and trend analyses that are then fed into a model-
ling framework. These different approaches can be used 
alone or in combination to develop energy scenarios. 
Herein, participatory scenarios are briefly described 
because, in the context of energy transitions and sus-
tainable development, we observe today an increasing 
interest and value in involving relevant stakeholders at 
an early stage in decision-making. 
Participatory scenarios result from a scenario devel-
opment/elaboration approach that provides a platform 
for different actors – from industry, government and the 
public – to better understand the perspectives of other 
actors, thereby stimulating social learning and trigger-
ing systemic thinking. In particular, capacity is built for 
participants to contemplate diverse futures and associ-
ated socio-ecological challenges (Johnson et al., 2012) 
or socioeconomic challenges. Participatory scenarios 
thus serve to align visions among the diverse actors 
and guarantee their respective engagement to reach the 
agreed-upon vision. 
The French National Energy Debate 27 illustrates the ap-
plication of participatory scenarios through civil society 
engagement to inform the French Energy Transition. No-
tably, to inform the National Debate, quantitative and 
normative scenarios – obtained by coupling visions and 
analytical expertise and developed by different stakehold-
ers and institutions (such as, ADEME, Agence Nationale 
de la Recherche, Union Française de l’Electricité, and 
Gaz Réseau Distribution France) – were analysed and 
discussed. The outcome of the National Debate has 
influenced the Loi de programmation sur la transition 
énergétique – the legal framework for the French Energy 
Transition.  
While in the French National Debate, a set of already-quan-
tified scenarios was brought to the participatory platform, 
it is also quite common to elaborate on qualitative sce-
narios on a participatory basis. For instance, Bibas et al. 
(2012) combined a participatory scenario with an energy 
system model (see Section 4) to assess economically 
feasible pathways to a low-carbon French economy. To 
improve the outcome of the participatory process, con-
text visualization, visual analytics, and often role games 
are used. Such a participatory scenario process was 
applied to study the potential for further decentralization 
of the German energy infrastructure (Karger and Marke-
witz, 2011).
27 Report of the national council for the National Debate on the Energy Transition: “Quelle trajectoire pour atteindre le mix énergétique 
en 2050?,” Maryse Arditi, 2013. See also, Bibas et al. (2012).
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4.
MODELLING  
ENERGY DEMAND
Many scenarios are developed on the basis of outcomes of one or many energy models, or of different pa-
rameterisations for a single model. Alternatively, different qualitative scenarios are fed into energy models for 
quantification. Energy modelling has been used since the 1950s to analyse energy systems or subsystems to 
different ends such as to:
• Improve the understanding of current and future markets in terms of supply, demand and prices
• Facilitate better design of energy supply systems in the short, medium and long-term for given 
demand forecasts
• Ensure sustainable exploitation of scarce energy resources
• Assess the present and future interactions of the energy system and rest of the economy
• Assess the potential implications in terms of environmental quality
• Assess the environmental, energy and economic policy impact.
There are different types of energy models. These are broadly classified as top-down (macroeconomic), bottom-up 
(techno-economic or engineering) or hybrid (energy-economy) models. There are also methodological differences as 
to how these models are used to produce scenarios. In particular, models differ in their use of equilibrium (general 
or partial), optimization (minimize / maximize some objective function – cost, sustainability metrics, welfare, profits 
– under number of constraints), accounting models, and simulation methods (solve a set of equations, which are 
often specified to correspond to welfare maximisation). They are based on different theoretical or scientific foun-
dations, namely engineering and social sciences, including economics (typically, neoclassical or new-Keynesian 
schools of thought even though behavioural economics is gaining traction; see Box 10). In some of these models, 
energy demand enters as an exogenous parameter. In others, an endogenous approach is taken.
Figure 4 illustrates a three dimensional representation of 
energy-economy models, as described below:
• An ideal model (top-right) will incorporate all relevant fea-
tures from the three dimensions but there may be costs 
(computational and informational costs) associated with 
the development and quantification of such full-fledged 
flexible models. 
• Conventional top-down models focus on macroeconomic 
completeness and, as will be discussed below, typically 
make simplistic (and, sometimes, unrealistic) assumptions 
about the microeconomic behaviour of agents. 
• Conventional bottom-up models on the other hand often 
ignore the complexity/realism of microeconomic behav-
iour, focusing instead on technological explicitness.
Figure 4: Hybrid modelling of energy-environment 
policies – reconciling bottom-up and top-down. 
Source: Adapted from Hourcade et al. (2006)
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Box 10: Economic theories
Economic modelling approaches used in energy models are typically based on neoclassical theories or neo-Keynesian 
theories or a combination of both.
Neoclassical economics has influenced the modelling of microeconomic decisions for several decades. Neoclassical 
frameworks typically impose strong assumptions regarding optimizing behaviour – consumers maximise utility under budget 
constraints and firms maximise profits under cost constraints; competition in markets. Perfect competition implies that 
markets instantaneously clear (general equilibrium approach), implying full employment in the labour market and interest 
rates that balance household savings with capital demanded by firms for investment. It further assumes perfect foresight, 
and that consumer preferences are given. Energy models based on the neoclassical framework, by using different levels of 
demographic and sectoral disaggregation, allow for a diversity of behaviours, but still assume rational, optimising behaviours.
Neo-Keynesian models relax the assumption of instantaneous price adjustment and allow for slow-adjustment of effective 
quantities and their prices to their notional level, thus allowing for the existence of sub-optimal equilibria such as involuntary 
employment. Neo-Keynesian macroeconomic frameworks are in general aggregate models and typically do not distinguish 
between different types or energy carriers and end-uses. As a result they are not useful, unless linked to other (bottom-up, 
sectoral) models, for effective assessment of energy and environmental policy.
A third class of economic paradigm is Behavioural Economics that can be particularly informative for the analysis of energy 
demand, particularly in view of the impact of consumption behaviour on the effectiveness of energy efficiency and energy 
sufficiency policies. Behavioural economics purport that agents with similar economic characteristics can display different 
behaviours as a result of cognitive limitations, encompassing habit, as well as other behavioural factors such as greater 
aversion to losses than desire for same-sized games (as in Prospect Theory), preferences for immediate gratification (as in 
hyperbolic discounting or time-varying discount rates). These and other features such as an endowment effect (the extra 
value individuals attach to goods they already own or have already received), status-quo bias (the tendency for people to 
stick to the current option or default option offered to them), and pro-social behaviour (in particular, concerns for fairness) 
are not captured in the neo-classical framework, but are relevant for energy systems undergoing transformation.
Various attempts have been made to combine top-down 
and bottom-up models as in hybrid models. Section 4.1 
provides an overview of different mainstream model-
ling approaches, revealing a dearth of microeconomic 
and behavioural realism. This is not a flaw in itself since 
various models have been developed for different uses 
and for specific contexts. Because energy transitions 
involve systemic effects at various levels, inaccurate rep-
resentation of energy demand in models can lead to poor 
policy analysis and prescriptions. Section 4.2 describes 
mainstream integrated assessment models, which are 
often large-scale, long horizon models, allowing for en-
vironmental feedback on the energy-economy model. 
Section 4.3 highlights on-going work aimed at improv-
ing microeconomic models to provide a more realistic 
account of the behavioural aspects of energy-related 
decisions, encompassing psychological as well as life-
style influences on energy decisions.  
4.1 Mainstream Energy 
Modelling Approaches
4.1.1 
Top-down modelling
Top-down models are macroeconomic models that 
represent energy use, technological change and the 
economy as a whole (i.e. at an aggregate level) focusing 
on macroeconomic effects and are based on realistic 
neo-classical representations of consumer behaviour and 
firm behaviour. While they lack detailed representation 
of technologies, they include feedback mechanisms to 
and from the energy systems, making them suitable for 
research on energy policy-making. But, some macroe-
conomic models such as NEMESIS (New Econometric 
Model Evaluation by Sector Interdependency and Sup-
ply 28) explicitly model technological change as a result 
of investment in research. 
28 www.ecmodels.eu/index_files/The NEMESIS Model.pdf
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Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models are a 
specific type of top-down model that focuses on mul-
ti-market equilibrium in an economy (e.g. GEM-E3 29). 
Because CGE models capture, in a realistic manner, all 
economic transactions between the economic agents, 
they are particularly suitable for evaluating policy reforms 
and the choice of policy instruments, and for capturing 
the complex relationship among all sectors. Top-down 
models using econometric analysis, e.g. HERMES 30 and 
NEMESIS are more suited as projection tools. Another 
subclass of top-down models is the Input-Output model 
that sets up a mathematical model (based on a set of 
algebraic equations) to represent the structure of the 
national economic system and the social processes.  
Demand in top-down models is derived endogenously. 
Typically, energy consumption is directly related to in-
come through a nested utility function that is based on 
specific assumptions. For instance, the Dynamic Inte-
grated Climate-Energy (DICE) model (Nordhaus, 1992) 
focuses on price-quantity relationships and feedback 
to the economy (equilibrium) with few demand and fuel 
categories. In GEM-E3, consumers and firms respectively 
maximize welfare and minimize costs. GEM-E3 uses the 
Stone-Geary Utility function, which implies that the de-
mand function is such that expenditure is linear in price 
and income; and demand is sensitive to all prices. The 
model distinguishes between durable and consumable 
goods and services, where utility from a durable derives 
from using the durable good above a subsistence level. 
The main drawback of top-down models for demand 
anticipation is the highly aggregate nature of energy de-
mand (and supply) specifications. 
4.1.2 
Bottom-up modelling
Bottom-up models are techno-economic models that 
have extensive technological details and typically conjec-
ture a perfect substitution of old for new technologies and 
that society will always choose the least-cost technology 
option. These technical and behavioural shortcomings 
notwithstanding, bottom-up models do not include feed-
backs from the economy as a whole, i.e. they are based 
on partial equilibrium analysis. This implies that mac-
roeconomic effects of changes in prices and structural 
changes in the economy are not captured; instead the 
macroeconomic background remains exogenous. Par-
tial equilibrium models are often perceived to be very 
effective for evaluating the impact of policies of which 
the effects are expected to be limited to specific sectors 
or markets. That said, large changes in a single sector 
might require general equilibrium analysis. As such, in 
most cases, partial equilibrium analysis is preferred to 
general equilibrium analysis when policy changes under 
study are expected to produce effects on the energy 
markets that are too small to justify the complexity of 
general equilibrium models.  
Bottom-up models focus either on the supply-side and 
energy conversion to analyse the effect of introducing en-
ergy efficiency measures, e.g. Market Allocation Model 
(MARKAL 31) and Energy Flow Optimisation Model (EFOM; 
Finon (1974)) or on the demand-side to analyse changes in 
energy demand and consumption as a result of changes in 
human activities. Models of energy demand are based on:
• Energy accounting approaches concerned with 
balancing energy demand and resources, e.g. Long-
range Energy Alternative Planning (LEAP 32), which is 
an econometric, terminal consumption model. LEAP 
can be used to design the energy consumption mode 
against various developments on the basis of: (a) the 
current energy demand of each sector and (b) the 
forecasts of social and economic development in 
future years based on different policy packages and 
technology selection modes. While it can be used 
for scenario analysis conditional on prior scenario 
development, LEAP cannot be used for optimization.
• Simulation approaches, e.g. the World Energy Model 
(WEM 33, used by IEA for the World Energy Outlook) 
that focuses on quantities simulation. In particular, 
the demand module is based on disaggregated end-
uses where economic activity, energy prices and other 
variables are used for forecasting energy demand. 
Other examples include:
( i ) The IEA Energy Technology Perspectives (ETP), 
where the energy demand sector model is split into 
three sectorial models: transport (Mobility Model, 
MoMo), industry and building. These demand-side 
models are stock-accounting simulation models 
that allow for sectorial projections of energy use, 
emissions and costs until 2050. 
− ETP MoMo scenarios and projections are 
based on hypotheses about GDP and popula-
29 ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/gem-e3/model
30 See EC (1993)
31 A summary can be found at www.iea-etsap.org/web/Markal.asp
32 www.energycommunity.org/documents/LEAPIntro.pdf
33 www.iea.org/media/weowebsite/energymodel/WEM_Methodology_
WEO2011.pdf
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tion growth, travel demand, vehicle technology 
shares, fuel economy and costs. Fuel use is com-
puted using the ASIF framework 34.  
− Behavioural aspects (avoid / shift / improve) are 
integrated in the 2DS 35 passenger transport. The 
buildings model integrates end-use services such 
as space heating and cooling, lighting, residential 
cooking and appliances. The key variables of 
the model include GDP, population (urban vs. 
rural), share of flow area heated/cooled, appli-
ance penetration rate and appliance unit-energy 
consumption.  
− The industry model looks at low- and high-de-
mand variants for material production, focusing 
on the five most energy-consuming sectors (iron 
and steel, cement, chemicals and petrochemi-
cals, pulp and paper and aluminium).
( ii ) The Modèle d’Evolution de la Demande d’Energie 
(MEDEE; Lapillone and Chateau (1981)) is another 
simulation model of energy consumption, designed 
for long-term energy demand evaluation based on 
scenarios that concern a country’s social, economic 
and technological evolution. It is significant that the 
MEDEE family of models now includes MEDPRO, 
a model that puts emphasis on, among others, 
electricity load curves and greenhouse gases, 
making it useful to evaluate change induced by 
energy efficiency, energy substitutions and miti-
gation policies. MEDPRO provides perspectives 
on the consequences of social and technological 
evolutions for a country or region.
One important aspect of bottom-up models is their time 
and spatial resolution, enabling them to capture the im-
pact of the renewable energy supply dynamics on energy 
demand. There is a risk in downplaying the importance of 
time and space resolution; poor spatiotemporal resolu-
tion, for instance, does not capture the need to integrate 
certain types of technologies like storage or demand-re-
sponse or smart-charging of vehicles (Pina et al., 2013). 
4.1.3 
Hybrid modelling
Hybrid models aim at combining the technological explic-
itness of bottom-up models and the economic richness 
of top-down macroeconomic models. The two types of 
models can be combined through a soft- or hard-linking 
approach. Hard-linking implies that the bottom-up and 
top-down models are integrated into a single mod-
el, which by necessity, is simplified for optimisation. 
Soft-linking means that the models are linked through 
an iterative process; the respective models are aligned 
when certain key parameters, e.g. prices and quantities, 
converge. Such convergence may not be easy to achieve. 
MARKAL Macro 36 is an example of a hybrid model that 
has been developed to facilitate direct calculation of 
macroeconomic impacts due to changes in the energy 
sector as well as endogenous behavioural change in en-
ergy service demands. MARKAL family models, including 
MARKAL Macro have been extensively used to inform 
the energy reforms in the United Kingdom
34 Activity (passenger travel) x Structure (travel by mode, load factors) x Energy Intensity = Fuel Use. 
35 2DS is a vision of a sustainable energy system of reduced Greenhouse Gas (GHG) and CO2 emissions.
36 www.psi.org.uk/site/project_detail/967
Box 11: Markal-Macro Model
Markal-Macro provides an integrated economic analysis by 
combining the detailed bottom-up MARKAL model with a 
simple economic growth model. Key advantages are:
• Firstly, it allows for demand feedbacks from changes in 
energy prices captured through price elasticities and sec-
tor-specific costs of altering demand for energy services. 
• Secondly, it accommodates autonomous demand chang-
es that make the Markal-Macro model useful for scenario 
analysis where energy demands are decoupled from eco-
nomic growth.
• Thirdly, demand-side behavioural response can be fac-
tored in.
MACROMARKAL
Energy Sources
Technological Characterisitics
Environmental Constraints
& Policies Labour
Useful Energy
Services
Energy
Payments
Capital Investment
GDP
Consumption
Technology Mix
Fuel Mix
Energy Sources and Levels
Fuel & Emission Marginal Costs
Ranking of Mitigation Options
Source: Adapted from Strachan, Kannan and Pye (2007)
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37 See Nordhaus (2011).
38 To be precise, stochastic projection models include not simply a range of values but some probabilistic description of values within 
the range. Deterministic analysis, on the other hand, can accommodate a range of values for an input through sensitivity analysis. 
39 Qualitative IAMs are developed when IAMS explore the climate change impact of future socioeconomic changes, many of which 
are not amenable to quantification. This approach was used by the IPCC as part of its 5th Assessment Report.
40 See Wilson, Pettifor and McCollum (2014).
Box 12: Overview of Integrated Assessment Models
IAMs fall into two broad classes: policy optimization and policy evaluation models. 
Policy optimization models can be divided into three principal types:
• cost-benefit models, which attempt to balance the costs and benefits of climate policies
• target-based models, which optimize responses for given targets of emission or climate change impacts
• uncertainty-based models, which deal with decision-making under conditions of uncertainty.
Policy evaluation models include:
• deterministic projection models, in which each input and output takes on a single value
• stochastic projection models, in which at least some inputs and outputs take on a range of values. 38
Current integrated assessment research uses one or more of the following methods (Rotmans and Dowlatabadi, 1998):
• computer-aided IAMs to analyse the behaviour of complex systems
• simulation gaming in which complex systems are represented by simpler ones with relevant behavioural similarity
• scenarios as tools to explore a variety of possible images of the future
• qualitative integrated assessments based on a limited, heterogeneous data set, without the use of models. 39
IAMs have contributed to the establishment of important new insights to the policy debate, in particular regarding the evaluation 
of policies and responses, structuring knowledge, and prioritizing uncertainties. They have also contributed to basic knowl-
edge about the climate system as a whole. Nonetheless, IAMs face two challenges, namely managing their relationship with 
research and disciplinary knowledge, and managing their relationship with other assessment processes and to policymaking.
Source: Adapted from www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/wg3/311.htm
4.2 Integrated Assessment Models
Primarily developed for the purpose of climate model-
ling, Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) combine the 
socioeconomic and scientific aspects of climate change 
with the intent of assessing policy goals (see Box 12 for 
an overview). IAMs have traditionally been classified as 
either top-down or bottom-up models, but increasingly 
are being developed as hybrid models, combining the 
macroeconomic consistency of top-down models with the 
technological resolution of bottom-up models (Krey, 2014).
Models include DICE (see 4.1.1), which has been crit-
icized for its extreme sensitivity to initial assumptions 
and choice of discount rates, or the Regional Integrated 
Model of Climate and Economy (RICE 37), which is a first 
attempt at disaggregating IAMs at regional level. 
Attempts are also being made at nesting demand in IAMs. 
For example, for the purpose of estimating long-term 
energy demand in the building sector in India, Chaturvedi 
et al., (2014) use an IAM to estimate demand, with a view 
to discussing the implication of the booming building 
industry for Indian energy policy.
4.3 Improving the behavioural 
foundations of energy models
Conventional top-down and bottom-up models do not 
adequately capture complex and technological dynamics 
of end-use sectors in terms of end-use behaviour. There 
is a need for models that reflect behavioural realism. The 
EIA and IIASA 40 have been investigating the potential 
need for integrating insights from behavioural economics 
to improve the representation of consumer behaviour in 
NEMS and IAMs, respectively, in order to enhance the 
quality of energy demand analysis. 
Both studies begin by expanding on the reasons for 
applying behavioural economics to energy demand mod-
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Box 13: Overview of the BLUE, Res-IRF and CIMS models
The BLUE model is based on probabilistic systems dynamic simulation and explores the interactions of different actors, the 
emergence of regimes and niches and associated uncertainties. Though dynamic, the model is myopic, that is actors make 
decisions assuming that current conditions will persist but they exhibit adaptive behaviour. The focus is on the electricity market 
and studies the impact of different behavioural parameters (market heterogeneity, defined as sensitivity to cost differentials in 
the uptake of new technologies; intangible costs and benefits; hurdle rates, which reflect diverse sensitivity to upfront capital 
investment; retrofitting/replacement rate; and demand elasticities) on the least-cost electricity solution.*
The Res-IRF model is “a bottom-up module of energy consumption for space heating, [that] has several distinctive features: 
(i) a clear separation between energy efficiency, i.e. investment in energy efficient technologies, and sufficiency, i.e. changes 
in the utilization of energy-consuming durables which allows the rebound effect to be assessed; (ii) the inclusion of barriers to 
energy efficiency in the form of intangible costs, consumer heterogeneity parameters and the learning-by-doing process; (iii) an 
endogenous determination of retrofitting which represents trade-offs between retrofit quantity and quality. The model is designed 
to assess and compare energy efficiency policies with a range of instruments (standards, carbon prices, subsidies, etc.).” **
In CIMS, a hybrid model, different behavioural parameters are used to more realistically represent consumer preferences for 
technologies. They include discount rate, representing time-value preferences; heterogeneity, accounting for the fact that different 
consumers have distinctive preferences for various technologies and therefore different valuations of their costs and benefits; 
and intangible costs, which represent non-financial costs associated with specific technologies (for example, greater risk asso-
ciated with new technologies or different payback periods, to the extent they cannot be quantified due to lack of knowledge).***
* www.ucl.ac.uk/energy-models/models/blue
** www.imaclim.centre-cired.fr/spip.php?rubrique87&lang=en 
See also rp.urbanisme.equipement.gouv.fr/puca/activites/prebat_220612/CIRED.pdf
*** Navius Research (2012). See also rem-main.rem.sfu.ca/theses/BeuginDale_2007_MRM443.pdf
elling. Regarding IAMs, Wilson, Pettifor and McCollum 
(2014) first observe that there is empirical evidence to 
suggest that many features cannot be explained through 
unbounded rationality or the neoclassical assumption of 
IAMs. Secondly, social sciences emphasize that end-user 
behaviour is driven by factors other than costs and prices. 
Thirdly, models with limited behavioural realism are not 
sufficient for evaluating inter alia energy-efficiency and 
climate-change mitigation policies.
EIA (2014) provides complementary rationale for turn-
ing to behavioural sciences: (i) energy consumption in 
homes and households with similar characteristics can 
vary widely; (ii) there are widespread and consistent dis-
connects between attitude and behaviours with respect 
to the environmental impact of energy consumption and 
awareness of energy conservation; (iii) adjustments to 
energy efficiency policies and programmes are necessary 
and should take into account individual decision-making 
biases; (iv) neighbourhood ranking of energy consumption 
leads to a sustainable reduction in energy consumption; 
and (v) pro-energy efficiency consumers are free-riding 
on subsidies for hybrid automobiles and solar panels. 
The perceived policy-relevance of models with added 
behavioural features seems to provide a strong impetus 
for both research and applied work in this area. But, to 
date, there are very few behavioural models (see Box 13) 
namely, (i) Behaviour Lifestyles and Uncertainty Energy 
Model (BLUE) developed at UCL (UK), Consolidated Im-
pacts Modelling System (CIMS 41) developed by Canadian 
researchers and the French Residential module of Ima-
clim-R France (Res-IRF) model on the savings potential of 
the French residential sector (Strachan and Warren, 2011).
These few existing behavioural models relax rationality 
assumptions and attempt to represent different forms of 
market barriers and failures through parameters such as 
the discount rate (to capture time preference, option value 
and risk premium), market heterogeneity parameters (to 
account for different preferences across consumers and 
businesses), variables to capture hidden costs (intangible 
41 CIMS belong to the class of IAMS, and is the only IAM that is not based on the assumption of a representative agent, whose be-
haviour can be represented by utility-maximisation (or even, price responsiveness) under income constraints.
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42 Most energy models include exogenous or autonomous technological change through autonomous energy efficiency improvement. 
Many models also account for endogenous or induced technological change – as a result of learning by doing – by means of tech-
nological learning curves, but do so in a rather indiscriminate way. The present Concept Note does not address this topic in detail. 
It is only highlighted that particular attention should be paid to the mechanisms that drive learning-by-doing in the model. These 
depend, among others, on model structure (e.g. top-down or bottom-up models and assumptions about expectations/foresight 
(discussed in Section 5.1.1). 
43 Wilson, Pettifor and McCollum (2014) explore how some of the above factors are likely to impact the adoption of alternative fuel 
vehicles.
44 A number of behavioural factors and behavioural rules can be easily incorporated in NEMS owing to its modular and highly segment-
ed structure. As for IAMs, Wilson, Pettifor and McCollum (2014) report that MESSAGE can accommodate some of the behavioural 
features in the buildings and transportation sector, but that more work is needed to extend such analysis to other IAMs.
costs, that may be modulated by a temporal parameter 
to capture information externalities) and innovation exter-
nalities (e.g. with learning-by-doing functions 42) 43.  Many 
of these parameters and newly incorporated variables 
are parameterized according to expert elicitation; more 
objective parameterizations are needed. 
Both the EIA (2014) and Wilson, Pettifor and McCollum 
(2014) start out by identifying and then prioritising be-
havioural factors that could both significantly impact 
demand and have policy implications. The prioritisation 
is based on the strength of the evidence base (including 
the extent to which there is consensus about the direc-
tionality of influence of the behavioural factor); the impact 
on model analysis, including links to policy levers; and 
the ease of implementation in IAMs and NEMS modelling 
structures. 44 These studies highlight the need for a better 
evidence base. Moreover, the purported policy relevance 
of these behavioural models also suggests that research 
is needed to understand why social practices change and 
how they impact energy demand.
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5.
DIFFERENT FACETS 
OF DEMAND-SIDE 
UNCERTAINTY
Many uncertainties in energy systems are irreducible because some developments within the energy system 
are unforeseeable. As a result, long-term energy forecasts are almost always wrong and sometimes even wildly 
mistaken (as discussed in Section 2). It is therefore dangerous for policymakers to over-rely on them (Yetiv and 
Field, 2013). More sophisticated forecast models are not necessarily a panacea as “attempting to improve the 
quality of forecasting by increasing the sophistication of analysis is a bit like adding new wings to your car because 
it wouldn’t fly with the first pair: the fault lies not with the accessories but with the vehicle itself” (Robinson, 
1982). As such, forecasts may be more suited for short-term planning and other scenarios for long-term planning.
For long-term planning, there are some issues – technical, economic, political and social – about what knowledge 
can be built and incorporated into formal models, often at minimal cost of model complexity but with substantial 
gains in terms of policy or strategy relevance and usefulness. For instance, the sensitivity of model outcomes and 
policy prescriptions to discount rates needs to be better understood at both a strategic and policy level. Model 
uncertainty about physical and socioeconomic processes, encompassing consumer attitudes and business 
models, should be more thoroughly addressed. Likewise, the extent to which regulatory frameworks need to 
change should be factored into the analysis (UK ERC, 2014; Kann and Weyant, 2000).
5.1 Improving demand-side 
realism in energy models
In energy models, in particular bottom-up models, the 
supply-side of the energy system is characterized quite 
extensively. Demand-side, on the other hand, is repre-
sented by means of conventional demand functions and 
energy intensities while behavioural changes, whether 
due to changes in attitudes (e.g. driving less) or structural 
changes (e.g. the rise of sharing economy) or technolog-
ical changes (e.g. energy efficiency), are either lumped 
together or represented in conventional ways according 
to end-uses. When planning for transitions that span sev-
eral decades, these approaches have serious limitations 
because they do not allow new behavioural patterns to 
unfold/emerge. They can also be addressed by explor-
atory scenarios and fed into existing models.
There are also different views as to how to handle de-
mand-side dynamics and associated uncertainties. 
Consider the rebound effect. Some argue that it should 
be explicitly incorporated into energy models, whether 
rebound effect is computed in terms of the energy-ef-
ficiency gap or emissions.45 Others argue that “to the 
extent that rebound is fully captured through estimates of 
elasticities, partial and general equilibrium models include 
rebound by definition. The same is true for a number of 
45 See Jaffe and Stavins (1994).
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other integrated assessment models. For example, re-
bound effects can be explored by modifying a parameter 
in the MARKAL/TIMES family or models” (IRGC, 2013). 
Energy efficiency is also linked to adoption and better use 
of energy-efficient appliances and therefore technology 
adoption should be modelled from the perspective of 
demand for end-use appliances and their usage (Wilson 
and Grübler, 2011). Wilson and Grübler’s work indicates 
that there are behavioural lessons that can be learned 
from history, which are still relevant for current transitions. 
This section therefore explores some critical behavioural 
uncertainties that need to be better addressed in energy 
scenarios and, as appropriate, the models underlying 
them.
5.1.1 
Time horizons and expectations
Many models are optimized under assumptions of ration-
al expectations, perfect foresight (Muth, 1961), or myopic 
expectations. Sequential optimization is also common. 
The way expectations are formulated in energy models 
can have a significant impact on the outcome of interests 
such as investment in energy efficiency and demand 
elasticities. Perfect foresight assumes that the models 
are correct and that errors are random. In it, the modeller 
defines all the conditions determining prices, efficiency 
technologies and other relevant variables, and decisions 
(e.g. investment decisions by households and firms) are 
determined for the entire scenario horizon. Perfect fore-
sight works well when the environment is stable and not 
susceptible to external shocks. Perfect foresight expec-
tation is used in TIMES 46, a bottom-up model developed 
at IEA for exploring least-cost and long-term strategies 
in the energy sector, whether at a country or regional 
level; a stochastic version of TIMES includes the cost of 
uncertainty and a real options theory (see section 5.4.2). 
Myopic expectations assume that the current system 
structure will not change dramatically over the planning 
horizon. Used in PRIMES 47 for some sectors – and used 
in the development of the European Commission’s Energy 
Roadmaps 2030 and 2050 – and GEM-E3, the evaluation 
of an investment is based on current prices and current 
activity. Myopic models are thus relevant for short-term 
decision-making (see Box 14) under the assumption of 
no structural changes to the energy system. 
How expectation (perfect or myopic foresight) is modelled 
affects how well the model can account for endoge-
nous preference formation and structural changes in 
preferences. But this is an area that has received lit-
tle attention either in literature or in practice. That said, 
there is an emerging approach that assumes neither 
perfect foresight nor myopic expectation. It is based on 
System Dynamics and agent-based modelling where 
agents (consumers and firms) use heuristic forecasting 
approaches for prices and other relevant variables when 
deciding on investments. The TIMER model is based on 
this approach (de Vries, et al., 2001). TIMER has been 
developed to analyse the long-term dynamics of energy 
conservation and the transition to non-fossil fuels – where 
fuel and technological substitution processes are driv-
en by prices – and understand the long-term trends for 
energy-related greenhouse gas emissions. See Box 15 
for a description of the TIMER Energy Demand module.
Box 14: Myopic models for assessing the impact of short-term decisions 
Myopic MESSAGE is a model to analyse near-term policies and their consequences for long-term objectives and is a myopic or 
limited foresight version of the long-term energy system model MESSAGE, developed to better understand the implications for 
energy system evolution under the conditions of short-term decision making. In contrast to the traditional systems engineering 
and macroeconomic energy models with perfect foresight, the myopic model allows analysis of the implications of alternative 
planning horizons for decision making. It provides a suitable framework for exploring path-dependency and lock-in-effects in 
the energy system. In particular, the framework is used for the explicit assessment of the consequences of short-term decisions 
for achieving long-term objectives.
Source: www.iiasa.ac.at/web/home/research/modelsData/MESSAGE/MYOPIC-MESSAGE.en.html
46 www.iea-etsap.org/web/Times.asp
47 www.e3mlab.ntua.gr/e3mlab/PRIMES Manual/The PRIMES MODEL 2013-2014.pdf
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Box 15: Demand determination in TIMER model
Source: Figure adapted from van Ruijven et al. (2010); Text based on de Vries et al. (2001)
48 Following Gifford (2011), dragons of inaction include limited cognition, ideologies, comparisons with others, sunken costs, discord-
ance, perceived risks, and limited behaviour (i.e. adopting behaviours that are easy to implement (low-hanging fruit) but necessarily 
the most beneficial possible action). 
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5.1.2 
Human behaviour and social preferences 
Human behaviour and social preferences, encompassing 
institutional and jurisdictional frameworks, supply-chain 
bottlenecks, and social barriers such as Not In My Back 
Yard (NIMBY) and Build Absolutely Nothing Anywhere 
Near Anyone (BANANA) attitudes and so-called dragons 
of inaction 48 can be important factors that influence the 
scope for converging to equilibrium points (defined as, for 
example, least-cost energy models) on the one hand, and 
influencing the outcomes of public and policy debates on 
the other hand. The UK ERC (2014) has stipulated that in 
view of systemic uncertainties related to the role of public 
attitudes “[…], there is a need to move beyond narrow 
framings of public attitudes […]” and the importance of 
“[…] engaging with the public in the kind of energy system 
they would like to see” rather than “persuading the public 
to accept a given set of technologies.” 
It follows that policies and choices that ignore behavioural 
change or structural changes in preference are bound 
to fail or be totally counterproductive. In this respect, it 
is often assumed that incumbents will necessarily resist 
change and raise artificial barriers to stall the emergence 
of new technological niches. Acknowledging that in-
cumbents may seek to defend their market positioning 
through adaptation and understanding how, can help 
shed new light on the likely evolution of energy demand, 
and could be informed by agent-based modelling. 
Other challenges related to the interrelationship between 
technological changes and social behaviour at individ-
ual, group and macroeconomic levels should also be 
addressed. For example, demand response associated 
with smart grid deployment, including firm-household 
interaction needs to be understood: the development 
of intra-day energy markets can raise feasibility issues 
with respect to supply-demand balancing of the electric-
ity network. Dedicated electricity market models using 
agent-based analysis can be useful (Jackson, 2010).
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It would be particularly interesting to identify socioeco-
nomic and technological response strategies to energy 
challenges. Modelling frameworks such as MESSAGE 
developed at IIASA and used for IPCC reports and IIASA 
GEA reports can be developed to that end. 
5.1.3 
Time discounting and time preference
Discount rates help assess temporal trade-offs between 
the short-term and the long-term. A high discount rate 
places a strong preference for present-oriented actions. 
Different types of discount rates used in energy modelling 
are: the social discount rate, economic or market rate, 
hurdle rate, and individual or private discount rates 49. 
Model outcomes are not invariant to the chosen discount 
rate (Wilkerson et al., 2013). Many models intended for 
policy analysis use social discount rates 50, but these 
ignore heterogeneity in the time preference of individuals. 
The choice of an appropriate discount rate (e.g. social 
vs. private discount rate 51) is important to avoid ex-post 
policy regret (Long, Zerbe and Davis, 2012) while under-
standing which discount rates have been used across 
different analyses can help resolve disagreements on 
energy-related policies (Goulder and Williams III, 2012). 
Declining social discount rates have been proposed in 
literature because of uncertainty (Weitzman, 2001) and 
heterogeneity in the time preference of individuals (Gollier 
and Zeckhauser, 2005). However, there is some contro-
versy about time-declining social discount rates. Viscusi 
(2007), for instance, provides powerful analytic arguments 
that declining social discount rates produce clear irra-
tionalities in decision making, such as the possibility of 
policy choice reversal, depending on when the decision 
is taken. 
Wilkerson et al. (2013) study the sensitivity of scenari-
os to discount rates, focusing on end-use technology 
choice in the commercial and residential sector in the 
EIA’s NEMS and highlighting that high discount rates is 
associated with minimum efficiency (see Box 16). Their 
analysis also reveals other factors that influence efficient 
technology uptake and, by extension, energy demand. 
So, depending on the sensitivity of energy demand to 
discount rates, quite large variations can be obtained for 
small changes in discount rates. 
There is significant uncertainty as to the level of dis-
count rates that should be used. This is particular true for 
emerging technologies such as low-carbon technologies. 
49 Private discount rates depend on such assumptions as technological readiness/technology maturity: when consumers and sup-
pliers are hesitant to adopt new technologies, a high subjective discount rate is generally imputed. But this may ignore feedback 
effects of technology deployment and policy on consumer perception. In general, it is also not clear whether consumers correctly 
discount the future (Hassett and Metcalf, 1993).
50 This even if most energy models assume that energy demand and supply are based on price-driven interactions in markets. The 
discount rates of the interacting agents are not homogeneous: firms use weighted average cost of capital and individuals use 
subjective discount rates. 
51 See also IEA (2009).
Box 16: Sensitivity of final energy demand to discount rate 
The figures show the final energy demand in the commercial (left) and residential (right) sectors for different efficiency scenarios, 
where the different efficiency levels are associated with different discount rates, e.g. 0% for maximum efficiency and 20% for 
moderate efficiency.
Source: Wilkerson et al. (2013)
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52 See for example WBCSD (2010)
53 Otherwise, models are quantified using reductionist methods.
In general, discount rates depend on technology maturity 
and policy risk, market arrangements and prices, sys-
tematic risks and idiosyncratic risks. Different discount 
rates can be obtained depending on, for example, the 
treatment of different types of risks (Lind et al., 1982). 
Considered together, these suggest that the quality and 
reliability of energy demand assessment can possibly 
be improved through a more rigorous choice of discount 
rates. But there are technical challenges too. Hyperbolic 
discounting as informed by behavioural economics, for 
instance, may make equilibrium models intractable.
5.1.4 
Welfare and scaling issues  
in end-use energy demand 
Welfare considerations are central to policy and are a nat-
ural concern of energy demand scenarios/models. Many 
models use aggregate behaviour or sectoral segmenta-
tion (typically industry, buildings and transportation). As 
such, they focus on either macro or meso-level behaviour. 
Models that break down energy demand from an energy 
services standpoint (e.g. passenger and freight transport, 
communication and lighting) and in terms of end-uses 
(e.g. food, entertainment, heating and cooling, etc.) are 
typically bottom-up models that are not concerned with 
welfare maximization. So, there are limits to using mac-
ro and meso-level models to assess whether transition 
goals are consistent with preservation or Pareto improve-
ments in lifestyles. 
To assess the feasibility of transition targets (such as 
reduction of energy demand by 30-40% to achieve the 
UK’s target of reducing GHG emissions by at least 80% 
by 2050 as compared to 1990 levels), complex interac-
tions among sectors need to be modelled using system 
dynamics approaches as in Prospective Outlook on 
Long-term Energy Systems (POLES) models (LEPII-EPE, 
2009). To assess the welfare implications of reductions 
in energy demand, one needs to understand the drivers 
and impact of reduced energy demand on different seg-
ments of society. If demand is lower because end-use 
energy prices are too high, it may well be the case that a 
significant fraction of the population is worse-off. If lower 
demand is achieved through household investment in 
energy efficiency (e.g. retrofitting) at the expense of con-
sumption of other welfare-improving goods and services, 
energy transitions may lead to welfare losses. 
In this view, welfare assessment should not be an out-
come of scenario analysis; instead Pareto-efficiency 
should be a normative goal along the transition and 
therefore included in the model. This can be facilitated by 
backcasting scenarios (van Vliet and Kok, 2013). Road-
mapping 52 can be informed by behavioural models, which 
help understand socio-technical transition pathways and 
assess policy implications at micro-levels, for instance, 
by taking into account rural-urban differences, the size of 
households, income distribution. Top-down models that 
rely on household welfare maximisation and firm-level 
least cost optimisation assume purely utilitarian prefer-
ence functions based on consumption and profits and 
rational behaviour driven by prices and may fail to com-
prehensively capture the welfare impact of transitions. 
5.1.5 
Structural uncertainty
The interdependent nature of uncertainties faced by 
governments, industry, citizens and communities are 
not captured well by energy models, which are not only 
largely simplified because of computational constraints 53 
but are also uncertain. Structural or model uncertainty 
arises when there exists more than one plausible model 
structure (Morgan and Henrion, 1990). Moreover, different 
models place different value judgments on the evolution 
of drivers, which results in model biases such as path-de-
pendence and non-ergodicity. 
In common parlance, a system is ergodic if there is no 
path-dependence in its evolution; the system is therefore 
unaffected by the initial conditions. Such temporal ergo-
dicity requires weak interactions for the system to settle 
down. But large-scale transitions are often characterized 
by strong interactions. Breakdown of ergodicity involves 
the notion of memory, i.e. history matters, giving rise to 
path dependence. 
Path-dependence, in the form of adjustments lags, can 
also be a feature of model structure and can result in poor 
forecasts. Figure 5 shows the forecast of coal prices by 
the EIA from 1952-2005, indicating very slow adjustment 
to new lower prices and that forecasts were persistently 
above actual or realized coal prices. It is therefore impor-
tant to identify path-dependent features in energy models 
to the extent that they influence energy demand, and use 
or develop appropriate approaches to address them.   
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Spatial ergodicity means that the dynamics on the lev-
el of aggregate behaviour is deterministic, akin to the 
existence of a representative agent. The assumption of 
ergodic spatial relationships may explain why scenarios 
are wrong. An appropriate level of disaggregation may 
give better insights. Analysis of the EIA’s NEMS highlights 
the importance of segmentation and different behav-
ioural rules across these segments (Kann and Weyant, 
2000). Although the NEMS approach is not free from 
shortcomings, it suggests that the influence of behav-
ioural heterogeneity on demand dynamics needs to be 
addressed in energy models.
5.1.6 
Energy demand elasticities 
Energy demand elasticities are a convenient way to sum-
marize the responsiveness of energy demand to such 
factors as energy prices, income, prices of related goods 
and other relevant variables. Energy models have differ-
ent levels of demand of aggregation, both across and 
within sectors. Demand elasticities are also determined 
for different energy carriers, e.g. for electricity, oil and 
natural gas. A substantial amount of work goes into es-
timating these demand elasticities. But often, once the 
elasticities have been estimated, they are assumed to 
be constant in energy models. There may be a caveat in 
energy analysis if elasticities are assumed to be constant 
but are, in fact, not, i.e. if they are time-varying.54
Figure 5: Adjustment lags in coal prices. 
Source: Newcomer (2007) in www.irgc.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/3.-
Granger-MORGAN_The-forecasting-problem_IRGC-Beijing-2013.pdf
A recent study estimated the income 
and price elasticities of demand 
for domestic heating, passenger 
transport, and lighting in the United 
Kingdom over the 200-year period 
from 1800-2010 (Fouquet, 2014). The 
analysis showed that income elastic-
ities for energy services rose in the 
early stages of economic develop-
ment and then declined, but stayed 
positive throughout the entire peri-
od. While income elasticities can be 
represented by an inverse U-shaped 
curve, price elasticities followed a 
U-shaped curve but stayed negative, 
i.e. a rise in price leads a decrease 
in consumption, and vice versa (see 
Box 17). 
These temporal dynamics in elasticities lead Fouquet 
to suggest that the decline in energy consumption that 
would be needed in the most optimistic climate change 
scenarios, is unrealistic. However, demand for energy 
services also evolves as a result of economic develop-
ment and other economic, technological, political, social 
and cultural factors that are not captured in income and 
price elasticities. And, in many countries in the world, 
energy transitions are largely driven by environmental 
and political considerations. 
What does this suggest for how energy demand, in 
particular demand for fossil fuel, might respond to the 
significant drop in oil prices that began in June 2014? 
Views may differ on this topic but, should the drop per-
sist, fossil energy consumption need not necessarily rise. 
Investments in renewable energy may continue and the 
drop in oil prices provides a window of opportunity for 
governments across the world to cut down subsidies 
that have, for a long time, distorted prices of fossil-fuel 
energy (The Economist, 2015). Insights should also be 
sought regarding the time-varying cross-price elasticities 
of between fuels in different end-use sectors.
What are the implications of adding behavioural real-
ism to energy models? Laitner et al. (2000) highlighted 
that short-term behavioural improvements to ener-
gy demand modelling could be achieved inter alia by 
using non-constant price and income elasticities. EIA 
(2014) further recognises that income elasticities may 
54 The notion of time-varying demand elasticities is not new. See Fouquet (2014) and references therein regarding both the use of 
single and constant estimates, and other attempts at estimating changes in elasticities.
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vary across income segments and that the effect may 
be nuanced by pro-environmental behaviour. This sug-
gests that lifestyle changes that may accompany and / or 
drive energy transitions may lead to changes in income 
and price elasticities. These changes must be tracked 
to reduce systemic biases in energy demand models, 
as when demand elasticities have a significant impact 
on model analysis.
5.2 Dealing with uncertainty: 
Some technical approaches
Uncertainty, to the extent that it is reducible or rele-
vant for decision-making purposes, can be dealt with 
in many ways. Epistemological uncertainty can be re-
duced. Qualitative information can be processed using 
the best available methods. Scenarios can be combined 
according to the goals of scenario development to ensure 
internal consistency. And models, fit for purpose, can be 
simulated for different input parameters, and outcomes 
compared (sensitivity analysis) and contrasted with the 
outcomes of other models. Kann and Weyant (2000) 
document several approaches to dealing with uncer-
tainty including scenario analysis (akin to the stochastic 
scenarios described below). Alternative approaches in-
clude (i) using alternative model structures in addition to 
changing parameters – these constitute the backbone 
of Cultural Theory (van Asselt and Rotmans, 1996) and 
exploratory modelling (Bankes, 1993), and (ii) minimax 
regret strategies (Loulou and Kanudia, 1999). Some other 
approaches are briefly described below.
5.2.1 
Cross-impact analysis (CIA)
Qualitative insights are often generated about how dif-
ferent model parameters and policy alternatives interact. 
Cross-impact captures the consequence of an event x on 
the probability of occurrence of another event y. These 
cross-impact effects or causal probabilities are obtained 
by collating and systemizing expert judgments (Gordon 
and Hayward, 1968) on the development of multiple vari-
ables and their interactions in large-scale interdependent 
systems.55 The Cross-Impact Balance Analysis (CIB) (We-
Box 17: Time-varying income and price elasticities of energy demand: the case of UK 1800 - 2000 
Source: Adapted from Fouquet (2014), © Oxford University Press
Left (top): Consumption of energy services in the UK  
(Index 1900 = 100), 1700 - 2010. 
Left (bottom): Price of consumer energy services in the UK  
(Index 1700 = 100), 1700 - 2010. 
Right: Income and price elasticities of demand for energy services, 
1800 - 2010.
55 The complexity of a large-scale interdependent system does not lend such integration to purely qualitative, albeit reasoned analysis, 
while structural knowledge about underlying systems is too scant for quantitative system dynamics.
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imer-Jehle, 2006) constitutes a specific and rather new 
approach, within the broad field of CIA, that provides a 
coherent and transparent approach to analytically inte-
grate interdisciplinary sources of knowledge in scenario 
development. CIB allows a systematic consideration of 
combinations of input parameters, hence making the 
uncertainty and complexity of societal (and non-quantifia-
ble) factors more explicit. This is by no means a panacea 
when it comes to addressing uncertainty in view of its 
reliance on the normative judgments of experts, which, 
unless elicited with care, are susceptible to heuristics and 
biases. Otherwise, the cross-impact approach provides 
a vehicle for upstream discussion of assumptions and 
desired outcomes (as in backcasting), either as prepara-
tory steps to scenario analysis or in forging better system 
understanding by analysts (Weimer-Jehle, 2006). More-
over, the CIB approach can be used to generate a large 
of number of qualitative scenarios and identify system 
tendencies – or basins of attractions in the parlance of 
complexity theory – that can be useful to improve the 
robustness of energy policies as to alternative energy 
demand futures. One limitation of CIB is that it provides 
figures for a certain point in time only.
5.2.2 
Stochastic scenarios 
Advances in computing capacity have helped improve 
optimisation under uncertainty for large-scale problems. 
Many scenarios are deterministic as in worse-case, best-
case or most-likely scenarios. These scenarios ignore the 
impact of different inputs – including interdependence 
among inputs – on modelling outcome. By definition, 
deterministic scenarios reduce insights and perceived 
uncertainties about the future. Stochastic or probabil-
istic scenarios can be obtained by using Monte Carlo 
simulations where uncertain inputs are represented by 
probability distributions. Different scenarios of what could 
happen and their likelihood are obtained as outcomes of 
Monte Carlo analysis. These stochastic energy scenarios, 
although rarely used or communicated, facilitate sce-
narios analysis and can be invaluable to policy-makers. 
5.2.3 
Real options theory
A real option is defined as the right, but not obligation, 
to undertake a business opportunity. It reflects the 
(managerial) flexibility to adapt decisions to unexpected 
developments (Dixit and Pyndyck, 1994). Real options 
can be used to analyse investment in the energy sector 
such as to evaluate the impact of an energy efficiency 
policy in relation to the possibility of a company or indi-
vidual to postpone decisions until new policy uncertainty 
(e.g. implementation of new measures) and/or technolog-
ical uncertainty is reduced. The diffusion rate of energy 
efficiency can thus be assessed through the lens of real 
options theory (Hassett and Metcalf, 1992; Chronopoulos 
et al., 2011), and associated policy and welfare impacts 
as well as energy demand levels evaluated. 
5.2.4 
Agent-based approaches
Agent-based modelling (ABM) provides another alter- 
native to deal with the uncertainty and complexity that 
result from more realistic models of energy system trans-
formations, e.g. by embedding technological development 
within societal contexts. ABM can serve dual purposes. 
Firstly, ABM enables the quantification of behaviour- 
driven models 56 and the development of objective models 
and scenarios. Examples include ABM analyses of con-
sumer choices of new cars (Mueller and de Haan, 2009), 
or of policy interventions for technology diffusion (Sopha 
et al., 2011). Secondly, refinements to ABM can be made 
to bridge short-term operational goals and long-term 
transformation goals.57  PRIMES (see Box 18 for a brief 
overview of the model) and TIMER (see section 5.1.1) are 
examples of agent-based models.  
56 See, e.g. Helbing and Balietti (2011).
57 See, for instance, Dijkema and Lukszo (2008).
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Box 18: Overview of PRIMES model
Source: Adapted from www.e3mlab.ntua.gr/e3mlab/PRIMES Manual/The PRIMES MODEL 2013-2014.pdf
A distinctive feature of PRIMES is the combination of microeconomic foundations of behaviour with engineering type models 
at a fairly high level of details while being compatible with long-term horizon modelling.
Typical Inputs
• GDP and sector-specific activity
• Set of economic & environmental 
policies and constraints
• Energy network infrastructure
• Technical & economic characteristics 
of future technologies
• Energy consumption habits and 
needs based on end-use services
• Cost curves, energy efficiency po-
tentials
Analytical Approach
• Behaviour of sector-specific agents 
simulated separately
• Behaviour modelled in line with mi-
croeconomic theory, including habit 
& risk preferences
• Prices determined by a set of energy 
markets that are cleared simultane-
ously
• Investment is endogenously driven 
by expected profits and market im-
balances
Selected Outputs
• Structure of energy demand by sec-
tor; energy use linked with activities
• Transport activity, modes / means 
and vehicles
• Set of market-clearing prices, includ-
ing emissions if applicable
• Impact indicators for diverse policies, 
e.g. for promoting technologies and 
efficiency

41 ////
6.
USEFULNESS AND 
LIMITATIONS OF MODELS 
AND SCENARIOS FOR 
ENERGY PLANNING
Kann and Weyant (2000) argue that policy insights from large-scale energy-economy models are relevant only 
to the extent that models agree on major recommendations. This is however rarely the case because modelling 
outcomes and scenarios depends on the final model structures, which are determined by (i) assumptions about 
the exogeneity and endogeneity of different system processes, (ii) a number of value judgments, e.g. about 
system parameters, and (iii) how model simplifications are introduced to render computations more tractable.
6.1 Diversity of scenarios and models
The diversity of scenarios produced by different organisa-
tions reflects divergent views on determinants of energy 
futures such as economic growth, the role of business 
and the extent of social adaptation. Backcasting can 
help steer upstream discussion on assumptions and the 
desired outcome of transitions. Often backcasting starts 
out with no modelling, but such heuristics can be better 
corrected for with analytical techniques that require sce-
nario makers and energy-system modellers to examine 
their assumptions closely.
The choice of models also reflects different perceptions 
and sociocultural and environmental values, which deter-
mine how problems at hand are conceived and addressed. 
Techniques of analysis 58 are likewise imbued with similar 
assumptions and momentum that exists for particular 
policies. These assumptions should be clearly stated 59, 
whether for policy analysis or for engaging with different 
stakeholders. Energy modelling is often seen as a key 
aspect in large-scale, long-term planning. In view of the 
diversity of models, it is important to choose models that 
are fit for purpose. For instance, macro models (based 
on econometric modelling or general equilibrium analy-
sis) may be more appropriate for national-level planning 
while micro-models are more suited for socioeconomic 
analysis. Factors that influence energy demand such as 
employment effects, rebound effects and the location of 
businesses are potentially better analysed with top-down 
as opposed to bottom-up models. 
Therefore, when analysing future energy demand, it is es-
sential to carefully match models with relevant qualitative 
scenarios and vice-versa. The risk of analysing scenarios 
(narratives and storylines) with incorrectly selected mod-
els is that of generating analyses and recommendations 
that are incongruous and raise controversy among the 
community of researchers and decision-makers alike. 
For instance, exploratory scenarios can be quantified by 
CGE models, bottom-up energy-system models or by 
58 The techniques adopted by different organisations are often constrained by data and software availability and competencies.
59 Many progress reports and public policy communications document the outcomes of analysis but the assumptions underlying the 
analysis are rarely stated. Taking different perspectives and using varying evaluation tools, analysts from different organisations do 
not reach the same conclusions. Lack of consensus creates significant controversy that can adversely affect public expectation.
42 //  Assessment of Future Energy Demand : A Methodological Review
agent-based models. The quantitative outcomes can be 
very different, even when the same qualitative scenario 
assumptions are fed into the model. 
6.2 Importance of time horizons
Hedenus, Johansson and Lindgren (2013) make the fol-
lowing recommendations: 
1. For short-term perspectives when energy 
infrastructures are largely intact, econometric based 
models and CGE models with short-term substitution 
elasticities between production factors may be more 
appropriate; some predictions are feasible. 
2. Energy-system (bottom-up) models are recommended 
for planning horizons over decades as they allow 
for investigating the role of different technologies, 
while CGE – provided hybrid models are used and 
parameters are flexible – may help examine economic 
restructuring. Thus, for analysing longer-term horizons 
(50 years or more) as in the case of planning for 
current energy transitions, bottom-up models are 
potentially better as they allow for large-scale system 
restriction. 60  
3. For even longer horizons such as 100 years, when 
the system may undergo intermittent technological 
and socioeconomic shifts, quantitative models 
become less useful. The emphasis is better placed 
on building qualitative and an internally consistent 
picture of plausible energy system development. IAMs 
are very long-term quantitative energy-economy-
environmental models that are used for that purpose 
and are primarily concerned with the climate-change 
impact of energy system transitions. IAMs, like many 
large-scale models, are highly modular in structure 
so they can accommodate a broad set of scenarios 
that rely on careful selection of the models. VLEEM 
(see section 3.1.3) developed by ENERDATA is one 
particular model that enables analysis of the evolution 
of demand with reasonable detail over a very long-
time horizon.
6.3 Towards robust energy 
planning and strategies 
Uncertainty and biases in energy scenarios and fore-
casts are likely to persist. Section 5 argued that it is vital 
to identify their multiple traits as they are embedded 
in data, model and foresight exercises. Over time, vi-
sions are likely to become increasingly contested and 
controversial. In this context, “[r]ather than generating 
foresights, the models should be seen as tools for gen-
erating insights and offering plausible pictures on how 
the future may develop in an internally consistent way” 
(Hedenus, Johansson and Lindgren, 2013), since, in the 
end, it only matters that energy policies be robust over 
a wide-range of output uncertainties based on variations 
in model inputs and alternative system dynamics (see 
Lempert et al. (2013a,b) for an overview of robust deci-
sion-making). There are energy models that are designed 
to help such robust decision-making approaches, e.g. 
MESSAGE-MACRO developed by IIASA. 
6.4 Communicating scenario 
and modelling outcomes 
to policymakers
Model-based scenarios can provide very helpful and 
important decision support. To enhance the usefulness 
of their work, modellers should ensure that the under-
lying assumptions and model uncertainties are well 
communicated so that they can be integrated in the de-
cision-making process. 
The effect of induced technological change (Weyant and 
Olvason, 1999; Edenhorfer et al., 2006) and heteroge-
neous behavioural responses to policy also needs to be 
expanded. The delays created in reaping the full impact of 
policy need to be integrated in policy recommendations 
to maximise effectiveness, in particular where the timing 
of policy implementation is concerned. 
Furthermore, the outcomes of scenarios and models, e.g. 
greenhouse gas emissions, policy variables such as tax 
60 This said, the choice of models should be driven by the research and policy question, depending on which, top-down models 
may be more appropriate. The analysis for example of the impact of CO2 taxes or any other policy measure that has an impact on 
multiple sectors of the economy is difficult with bottom-up models. Dynamic CGE (top-down) models are usually used for this kind 
of analysis for both medium (20-30 years) and long time horizons.
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rates, and energy consumption levels, should be commu-
nicated to stakeholders and policy-makers in simple and 
easy-to-understand ways. For instance, misinterpretation 
of modelling results by decision-makers can be reduced if 
modellers make the effort to translate abstract results into 
everyday-life terms, such as “1 € / litre of diesel” instead 
of “400 € / tCO2” carbon tax. Insights from behavioural 
economics, for instance, show that communicating about 
fuel efficiency using the measure of “miles per gallon” 
leads people to undervalue the benefits of replacing the 
most inefficient automobiles. Experimental evidence 
indicates that a change in communication (to “gallons 
per mile”) can promote smarter decisions about energy 
efficiency and energy use (Larrick and Soll, 2008).
Since information derived from energy models can 
change the preference of stakeholders and energy con-
sumers (Trutnevyte et al., 2011), more than that of the 
computation itself, the true added-value of the modellers 
lies in their ability to select and communicate the most 
relevant information in the most useful format rather than 
producing hundreds of graphs and tables. 
In recent years, a number of interactive online energy-cal-
culator tools have appeared to inform policy-makers and 
the public at large about trade-offs within the energy 
system. Examples include the UK 2050 Calculator 61 and 
the Dutch Energy Transition Model 62, which has the addi-
tional feature of being able to select various scenarios. In 
changing societal perception of energy transitions, these 
tools can influence preference. 
61 2050-calculator-tool.decc.gov.uk
62 pro.et-model.com
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7.
CONCLUSION  
AND WAY FORWARD
This Concept Note reviews various scenarios and mod-
els that can be used to anticipate energy demand. It 
emphasizes some of the limitations, in particular those 
related to uncertainty in assessing demand in the future. 
The world will be shaped by energy efficiency improve-
ments in all regions together with changes of policies. In 
Western Europe, energy efficiency and energy sufficiency 
are paramount to achieving the goals of the current wave 
of energy transitions. They will require a change in the 
paradigms of energy consumption and even lifestyle, 
including the rise of prosumerism (where energy con-
sumers take on the additional role of energy producer). 
In this context, assessing the evolution of energy demand 
will require a multidisciplinary approach to understand 
the multifaceted drivers of the transition toward low-en-
ergy consuming economies. The broader regional and 
international context and policies will also have to be 
integrated in national plans for energy transitions. Such 
an inclusive approach poses challenges to both sce-
nario developers and modellers because of a number 
of crosscutting issues that are often hard to quantify, in 
part because of the absence of historical precedence. 
Bearing in mind the trade-offs that exist between simple 
and complex models, it would be useful to explore: (i) the 
relevance of including behavioural drivers of energy de-
mand for different uses of models and scenarios; (ii) how 
quantitative information about the diverse drivers can be 
obtained in objective and verifiable ways; (iii) the extent to 
which behavioural economic frameworks should replace 
existing neo-classical paradigms; (iv) the relationship 
between short-run and long-run behavioural change – 
while policy can effectively effect short-run behavioural 
changes, whether and how these can be sustained over 
long horizons is an issue that is important to address; (vi) 
instances in which insights from behavioural economics 
can help improve the effectiveness of traditional inter-
ventions in energy policy and when they could crowd out 
those more effective traditional instruments; and (vii) how 
the coherence between scenarios, including explorative 
qualitative context-scenarios, and energy models can 
be improved to better assess future energy demand and 
inform strategic and policy decisions on the governance 
of energy transitions. 
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